BIFURCATION IN INTER-STATE CASES
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ABSTRACT
In the South China Sea Arbitration, China resolutely decided to
not appear, without even appointing its own arbitrator to an
arbitration under Annex VII of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS). Many criticized this decision as unwise, and
argued that the conventional litigation wisdom of contesting
jurisdiction exclusively at the preliminary phase serves to better
China’s interests, since it would not prejudice its decision of nonappearance at the subsequent proceedings over merits.
The validity of such a “wise” tactic rests upon bifurcation—the
division of the proceedings into determination of jurisdiction and
determination of merits. Bifurcation has been routinely practiced by
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) but has not been used much
in other forums of inter-state dispute settlement. The author
undertakes the first investigation of 14 cases which eventually went
to the UNCLOS arbitration (as of 2018). It finds that the majority of
tribunals adopted ad hoc Rules of Procedures by which the tribunals
retained discretion on the matter of bifurcation (discretionary
bifurcation), and in practice the tribunal’s flexibility terminates
upon the rejection of the request to bifurcate. In contrast, Article 79
of the ICJ’s Rules of Court, allows the Court to adjudicate on
questions raised within a duly submitted preliminary objection,
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with no proceedings on the matter of bifurcation (rule-based
bifurcation).
This paper traces issues of bifurcation to the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ), to evaluate why and how in the ICJ
bifurcation becomes a procedural right, finding that when rulebased bifurcation was added to the article governing preliminary
objections in 1926, they believed jurisdictional objections deserved
special treatment in the Rules of Court, allowing the Court to better
handle jurisdiction of inter-state disputes which was confined by the
consent of the parties. The subsequent revisions of the Rules of
Court in 1936, 1946, 1972, 1978, and 2001 gradually but solidly
provide that a party is entitled to bifurcation, notwithstanding a
general belief that bifurcation reduces the Court’s efficiency.
The divergence in practice may be determined by the distinctive
nature of the two forums (adjudicative/standing court and
arbitral/ad hoc tribunal), as judges/arbitrators balance
jurisdictional sensitivity with procedural efficiency to decide the
issue of bifurcation. This paper finds that the handling of
bifurcation in the UNCLOS arbitrations puts unwilling respondents
in an untenable situation: participation (with appointment of its own
arbitrator) means less jurisdictional sensitivity and probably results
in a negative decision on bifurcation; only non-appearance of the
unwilling respondent is thought to deserve bifurcation in which it
can fight exclusively on jurisdiction, yet the unwilling respondent
must deprive itself of such opportunities. This paper argues that
the value of rule-based bifurcation should be carefully considered,
by which an unwilling respondent is entitled to bifurcation, thus
allowing it to contest jurisdiction at the first place. An UNCLOS
arbitral tribunal may ensure the legitimacy of its judgments for the
settlement of inter-state disputes by adhering to the best practice
firmly rooted in the PCIJ and ICJ since the 1920s.
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INTRODUCTION

In the 1986 International Court of Justice (ICJ) Nicaragua case, the
United States participated in the preliminary proceedings to defend
its positions on jurisdiction and admissibility but withdrew its
participation from the proceedings on the merits.1 Recently, in South
China Sea Arbitration,2 an arbitration under Annex VII of the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 3 China’s nonappearance was debated, and scholars argued that China should
participate in the initial proceedings concerning the constitution of
the tribunal and raise issues of jurisdiction at the preliminary
objection stage.4 This view is predicated on the belief that China’s
participation to challenge jurisdiction, like what the United States
did in the Nicaragua case, would not prejudice its non-appearance at
the subsequent proceedings over merits.5 However, the validity of
this tactic rests upon bifurcation—a term commonly used in the field
of procedure to mean the division of the proceedings into
determination of jurisdiction and determination of merits. 6

1 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, para. 10 (June 27).
2
South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Award
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016).
3
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
4 See Jiangyu Wang, 国际法、国际关系与国家利益视角下的南海仲裁案 [The
International Law, International Relations and National Interest Concerns from
Chinese Perspective], 6 ASIA-PAC. SEC. & MAR. AFF., 1, 13 (2016); see also Bing Ling,
Speech at Fudan University: Why China’s Rejection is Against Its Own Interests
(Dec.
2016),
http://www.uscnpm.com/model_item.html?action=view&table=article&id=7961
[https://perma.cc/LP6G-GGQN]. See generally Julian Ku, China’s Legal Scholars Are
Less Credible After South China Sea Ruling, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 14, 2016),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/14/south-china-sea-lawyers-unclos-beijinglegal-tribunal/ [https://perma.cc/F97P-SGJ6] (providing an overview of Chinese
academics’ opinions on China’s non-appearance and possible participation in the
initial arbitration proceedings).
5 See Jiangyu Wang, Legitimacy, Jurisdiction and Merits in the South China Sea
Arbitration: Chinese Perspectives and International Law, 22 J. CHINESE POL. SCI. 185, 200
(2017) (arguing that China “would have been in a much better position on the legal
front had it formally participated in the case from the jurisdictional stage”).
6
See Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts & Docs, [hereinafter Rules of Court]
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/rules [https://perma.cc/DT7C-2XH6]. Bifurcation
may also involve determination of liability and determination of quantum of
compensation or damages award. Bifurcation in this paper refers to the former
concept of division of the proceedings, in which an international judicial organ
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Bifurcation is a procedural response to questions of jurisdiction
and/or admissibility, normally raised in the form of the preliminary
objection. With bifurcation, the said questions will be adjudicated
in a separate proceeding with a judgement or award at its closure.
The word bifurcation does not appear in the ICJ Statute or its
Rules of Court. 7 However, upon receipt of a duly submitted
preliminary objection, Article 79 of the Rules of Court on
preliminary objections explicitly provides for suspension of the
proceedings on the merits,8 and instead sets up a written proceeding
addressing objections.9 It is followed by a default oral hearing on
the preliminary objection.10 Eventually, the preliminary objection is
disposed of in the form of judgment.11 Thus, a party in front of the
ICJ is entitled to obtain self-contained proceedings on jurisdiction
and admissibility under the Rules of Court.12 Indeed, the party’s
procedural right to bifurcation has been gradually affirmed since the
era of the Permanent Court of Justice (PCIJ, the predecessor of the
ICJ), notwithstanding that the Court retains an inherent power to
handle its own procedure regarding jurisdiction,13 and in practice
the Court exercises its inherent power in no derogation of such a
right.14

treats jurisdiction and admissibility of claims as discrete issues in a distinct or
separate proceeding before further resolution of the merits of claims.
7 See id.
8 Id. art. 79(5).
9 Id. art. 79(5).
10 Id. art. 79(6).
11 Id. art. 79(9).
12 Id. art. 79.
13
Statute of the Court, I.C.J. Acts & Docs. (I.C.J. Statute), http://www.icjcij.org/en/statute [https://perma.cc/DR4L-D97A]. The procedure concerning
preliminary objections as whole (and the matter of bifurcation being part of it) in
principle falls into the inherent power of the Court as part of the management of
the legal proceedings, by virtue of the necessity to determine issues of jurisdiction
based on the principle of la compétence de la competence (art. 36(6)) and its power to
“make orders for the conduct of the case” (art. 48). See also SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE
LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 1920-2005 810 (4th ed. 2006)
(concluding that “through those two provisions of the Statute the Court can deal
with any matter that might arise as to whether it has jurisdiction in a case or
whether the case as a whole or a particular claim is admissible.”).
14
Indeed, in the Nicaragua case, the Court decided to bifurcate proceedings
without waiting for further submission of a preliminary objection. For further
discussion on this point, see infra note 92 and accompanying text.
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Many of the law of the sea disputes were brought pursuant to
the “default” arbitration under UNCLOS Annex VII 15 and have
made it one of the important legal battlefields for inter-state dispute
since the UNCLOS entered into force in 1994.16 In these cases, we
see the word “bifurcation” has been invariably used in ad hoc
tribunals’ Rules of Procedure. However, by the time this paper was
written, there were 14 Annex VII arbitral cases; the proceedings
were bifurcated in only four of them. 17 The tribunals’ Rules of
Procedure in the majority of Annex VII arbitrations were developed
by ad hoc tribunals under the influence of the Model Rules of
Procedure of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA, serving as
Registrar in these cases but more frequently used by international
commercial arbitrations), by which the tribunal retains discretion on
the matter of bifurcation (discretionary bifurcation).18
Unfortunately, in this very important forum for inter-state
dispute settlement we see the resurgence of non-appearance by
responding states 19 —apart from the aforesaid China’s non15
See UNCLOS, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 at art. 287(3) (noting that when no
preference has been stated regarding the means of dispute resolution under art.
287(1), the other two default forums are the ICJ ITLOS); see also id. art. 287(5) (noting
the default if the Parties have not accepted the same procedure available under art.
287(1)).
16
Since UNCLOS came into force in 1994 to 2018, 14 cases have been referred
to Annex VII arbitration and adjudicated, making it the most common means of
resolution of key UNCLOS disputes. In contrast, 15 out of the 23 ITLOS contentious
cases are requests for prompt release or requests for provisional measures pending
the constitution of an Annex VII arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS art. 290(5). In the
remaining seven “normal” cases, five are those initiated by a Party State under
Annex VII but subsequently transferred to the ITLOS under “Special Agreement”
reached by the Parties.
17
See Southern Bluefin Tuna (Austl. v. Japan), 23 R.I.A.A. 1, Award on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2000); The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Neth.
v. Russ.), Case No. 2014-02, Award on Jurisdiction (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014); South
China Sea Arbitration, Case No. 2013-19 (bifurcation was decided by the tribunals
without the participation of the respondent states); Dispute Concerning Coastal
State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No.
2017-06, Procedural Order No.3 Regarding Bifurcation of the Proceedings, 3 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2017). For details, see infra Part 3.
18 See UNCLOS, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 at Annex VII, art. 5 (“Unless the parties to
the dispute otherwise agree, the arbitral tribunal shall determine its own procedure,
assuring to each party a full opportunity to be heard and to present its case”). For
discretionary bifurcation stipulated in the Annex VII tribunals’ Rules of Procedure
and influence from Model Rules of Procedure of PCA, see infra note 117 and
accompanying text.
19
Non-appearance of the respondent state occurred frequently in the 1970s
and 1980s in the ICJ Cases of non-appearance (except for non-appearance only at
Provisional Measures) include: Icelandic Fisheries (U.K. v. Ice.; Germ. v. Ice.),
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appearance in South China Sea Arbitration, Russia also declined to
participate into the proceedings of the Arctic Sunrise arbitration.20
A less heeded phenomenon that indicates unwillingness of the
respondents vis-à-vis Annex VII arbitration is the moderate rate of
deviation to this “default” procedure—besides the 14 cases which
eventually went to the Annex VII arbitration, there were five cases
initiated under Annex VII arbitration that were subsequently
transferred by “Special Agreement” to the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), or its special chamber.21 Significantly,
ITLOS introduced the rule-based bifurcation into its Rules of the
Tribunal.22
Nuclear Tests (NZ v. Austl.; Austl. v. Fr.), Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v.
Turkey), United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran) and
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S) (the
United States refused to appear in the merits phase). In the 1950s there were two
cases of non-appearance: Corfu Channel (U.K. of Gr. Brit. & N. Ir. v. Alb.) (Albania
did not appear at the stage on reparation); Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.) (the
respondent did not appear in the preliminary phase). See generally J.B. ELKIND, NONAPPEARANCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1985); H.W.A. THIRLWAY,
NON-APPEARANCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1985) (exploring
the concept, procedure, and remedies for non-appearances); Ian Sinclair, Some
Procedural Aspects of Recent International Litigation 30 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 338 (1981)
(reviewing historical and contemporary instances of non-appearance); James D.
Fry, Non-Participation in the International Court of Justice Revisited: Change or Plus Ça
Change? 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 35 (2011) (challenging the notion that the
Nicaragua case was the last instance of non-appearance at the I.C.J.); Jonathan I.
Charney, Disputes Implicating the Institutional Credibility of the Court: Problems of NonAppearance, Non-Participation, and Non-Performance, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1987) 288 (expanding on the
problems faced by international tribunals with respect to non-appearance by
recalcitrant states); S.A. Alexandrov, Non-Appearance before the International Court of
Justice 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 41 (1995) (asserting that the reason for Article 53
of the I.C.J. Statute is to allow the court to function in the event of non-appearance).
20
Chao Zhang & Yen-Chiang Chang, The Russian Federation Refuses to Appear
Before the ITLOS and the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal, 14 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 405 (2015).
21
M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, Order of July 1, 1999,
2 ITLOS Rep. 17, para. 5; Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish
Stocks (Chile v. European Cmty.), Case No. 7, Order of Dec. 20, 2000, ITLOS Rep.
153, para. 6 (transferred to the ITLOS Special Chamber); M/V “Virginia G” (Pan. v.
Guinea-Bissau), Case No. 19, Judgment of Apr. 14, 2014, ITLOS Rep. 9, para. 6;
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the
Bay of Bengal (Bangl. v. Myan.), Case No. 16, Judgment of Mar. 14, 2012, ITLOS
Rep. 12, para. 5; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte
d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of
Sept. 23, 2017, para. 11 (transferred to the ITLOS Special Chamber),
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_merits/C2
3_Judgment_23.09.2017_corr.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6M9-W6AQ].
22
Rules of the Tribunal (ITLOS/8), as adopted on Oct. 28, 1997 and amended
on Mar. 15, 2001, Sept. 21, 2001 and Mar. 17, 2009, art. 97,
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In this regard, it is of interest to observe Russia’s position in the
pending Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of
Azov, and Kerch Strait, the second case in which Russia was brought
to Annex VII arbitration. 23 Notwithstanding Russia’s nonappearance in Arctic Sunrise and speculation that Russia might not
appear in the case at hand, 24 Russia elected to appoint arbitrator(s)
for the purpose of disputing jurisdiction.25 Presently, it appears that
Russia will participate and contest jurisdiction in a preliminary
proceeding. Significantly, the tribunal’s Rules of Procedure applied
in that case, unlike those employed by the majority of Annex VII
tribunals, contain a provision on preliminary objection
incorporating elements of Article 79 of the ICJ Rules of Court, under
which Russia is allegedly entitled to bifurcation.26
All of which seem to suggest that, notwithstanding their position
that refusal to appear is political in nature, 27 there is a space for
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/basic_texts/Itlos_8_E_17_03
_09.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3C5-EK3G]. This Article on Preliminary Objections
retains the major elements of Article 79 of the ICJ Rules of Court (suspension of
proceedings on the merits, written and oral proceedings on preliminary objections
and a wrap-up judgement). However, it requires that the objections shall be made
“within 90 days from the institution of proceedings”—which is a much shorter time
frame than the ICJ’s requirement of “three months after the delivery of the
Memorial.” Presently, 15 out of the 23 contentious ITLOS cases are requests for
prompt release or requests for provisional measures pending the constitution of an
Annex VII arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS art. 290(5). In the other seven cases in
which art. 97 of Rules of the Tribunal (ITLOS/8) may be applied, five were
transferred to the ITLOS by “Special Agreement”, under which circumstance a
party is less likely to raise preliminary objections. So far only in the unilaterally
initiated M/V “Norstar” (Pan. v. Italy) has the respondent filed objections within
90 days from the institution of proceedings and the ITLOS bifurcated the
proceedings according to art. 97. See M/V “Norstar” (Pan. v. It.), Case No. 25,
Preliminary Objections, Judgement of Nov. 4, 2016, paras. 15-16,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.25/Preliminar
y_Objections/Judgment/C25_Judgment_04.11.16_orig.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UG9U-RU2R].
23
Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and
Kerch Strait (Ukr. V. Russ.), Case No. 2017-06 (Perm. Ct. Arb., pending since 2016).
24
Julian Ku, As Ukraine Prepares to Take Russia to UNCLOS Arbitration Over
Crimea, I Predict Russia’s Likely Reaction, OPINIOJURIS (Jan. 2, 2016),
http://opiniojuris.org/2016/02/01/ukraine-prepares-to-take-russia-to-unclosarbitration [https://perma.cc/YLJ3-5QKU].
25
PCA Press Release, Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black
Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukr. v. Russ.), First Procedural Meeting in
Arbitration Under the Law of Sea Convention, (May 22, 2017).
26
For details, see infra Part 3.
27
SHABTAI ROSENNE, WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 94-95
(1989).
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unwilling states to exercise conventional litigation tactics as the
United States did in the Nicaragua case (and possibly for Russia to
follow in the pending Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait case).
Since the validity rests upon bifurcation, it requires a thorough
investigation of the practice and the judicial policy behind it. A
comparison of the ICJ’s Rules of Court and Annex VII tribunals’
Rules of Procedure, as well as their practice on the matter of
bifurcation, should be of interest to international lawyers.
This Paper contains three parts. Part Two will observe the
evolution of the rule-based bifurcation in the PCIJ and ICJ,
concluding that under Article 79 of the Rules of Court, this rulebased approach to bifurcation is clearly resolved in the modern
Rules of Court. Part Three lays out all 14 cases of the Annex VII
Arbitration (as of 2018), putting them into three categories of
practice to bifurcation. It compares circumstances in each category
of the cases and explains how the tribunals would in general
maintain flexibility with respect to bifurcation under the Rules of
Procedure. It then demonstrates how non-bifurcation became the
routine practice, but bifurcation is possible under certain
circumstances of non-appearance and agreement. Part Four
explores the policy behind the divergence of bifurcation practice
between ICJ and Annex VII arbitral tribunals. The divergence in
practice may be determined by the distinctive nature of the two
forums (adjudicative and arbitral) as they decide the issue of
bifurcation, balancing jurisdictional sensitivity against procedural
efficiency. It concludes that the value of rule-based bifurcation
should be carefully considered, by which an Annex VII arbitral
tribunal may ensure the legitimacy of its judgments for the
settlement of inter-state disputes by adhering to the best practice
firmly established by the PCIJ and ICJ.
2. BIFURCATION AS A PROCEDURAL RIGHT FOR THE PARTY RAISING
PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS: THE EVALUATION OF RULES ON
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION IN THE PCIJ AND THE ICJ
In the preparation of the Rules of Court in early 1922, the Court
discussed various issues surrounding the draft article on
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preliminary objections with regard to jurisdiction. A vote was taken,
and this draft article was omitted in the second reading of the draft.28
2.1. Early practice of the Permanent Court and the making of the rule
on “preliminary objections” in Article 38 of the Rules of Court
(1926)
Although the 1922 Rules contain no provisions on preliminary
objections, in the 1924 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, the
respondent, the United Kingdom, informed the Court that it
intended to raise preliminary objections to the Court’s jurisdiction
immediately after the applicant, Greece, filed its case (Memorial)
with the Court.29 In agreement with the respondent, the President
fixed the date for the filing of the objection. 30 The applicant
requested permission to make a written reply to this objection,
which was permitted, and the date for filing the reply was fixed. In
a separate jurisdictional judgment, the Court upheld the preliminary
objection relating to the claim in respect of the works at Jaffa, and
dismissed objections relating to the claim in respect of the works at
Jerusalem.31
The second instance in which preliminary objections were raised
when the Rules of Court were silent on the matter occurred in the
1925 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case.32 There, the
respondent, the Polish government, filed its case (Memorial), raising
certain preliminary objections in anticipation of the applicant
German government’s first pleading.33 The applicant then on the
fixed date filed a “Counter-Case” (Counter-memorial) in reply to the
Polish preliminary objections. 34 Public hearings relating to the

28
Preparation of the Rules of Court of January 30th, 1922 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No.
2, at 213-14, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-internationaljustice/serie_D/D_02_preparation_reglement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P8BNUQJS].
29
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B)
No. 3 (Aug. 30), at 9.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 36.
32
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germ. v. Pol.), 1925
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6 (Aug. 25).
33 Id. at 6-7.
34 Id. at 7.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss4/5

2019]

Bifurcation in Inter-State Cases

947

question of jurisdiction were arranged accordingly.35 The Court in
a separate jurisdictional judgment dismissed Poland’s preliminary
objections.36
Based on the experience in these two cases, the Permanent Court
adopted a new Article 38 concerning preliminary objections in the
Rules of Court of 1926, which contains four paragraphs.37 The first
two paragraphs set out the timing for submission and the contents
of preliminary objections. These two basic elements of qualification
for “preliminary objections” have been maintained but
subsequently modified as a result of the practice of the Court. 38
Once the preliminary objections are submitted, the Court establishes
deadlines for response and oral arguments on the preliminary
objection, as set out in paragraphs 3 and 4:
(3) Upon receipt by the Registrar of the document submitting
the objection, the Court, or the President if the Court is not
sitting, shall fix the time within which the party against
whom the plea is directed may submit a written statement of
its observations and conclusions; documents in support shall
be attached and evidence which it is proposed to produce
shall be mentioned.
(4) Further proceedings shall be oral unless otherwise
decided by the Court. The provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5
of Article 69 of the Rules shall apply.39
No explicit reference is made to the preliminary objection
resolution’s impact on the underlying proceeding. Moreover, there
is no provision in the Rules governing how the Court will dispose
of preliminary objections. However, in the course of discussing the
drafting of Article 38, the possibility that the Court might join the
question of jurisdiction to the merits was widely contemplated.40 In
Id. at 7.
Id. at 27.
37
Statute and Rules of Court, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 1, at 50-51,
http://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-internationaljustice/serie_D/D_01_1e_edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y45Z-JMT8].
38 See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
39
Statute and Rules of Court, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 1. supra note 37. The
last sentence of paragraph 4 refers to the Chamber of Summary Procedure, which
was omitted in 1936.
40
Annual Report from 1926-1927, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 3, at 199,
http://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-internationaljustice/serie_E/English/E_03_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EP4-7PE2].
35
36
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the 1933 Prince von Pless Administration case, applying this new
Article 38, the Court in the form of an order did in fact join the
preliminary objection to the merits.41 This issue was addressed in
the subsequent revision of the Rules of Court.
2.2. Further indication of the consequence of preliminary objections:
Rules of Court 1936/1946/1972/1978 and the 2001 Modification
In the “general revision” of the Rules of Court from 1931 to 1936,
Article 38 was revised and adopted as Article 62 in the Rules of
Court of 1936. 42 The draft article prepared by the Coordination
Committee introduced a new paragraph 5 to reflect the past practice
of the Permanent Court in the disposal of the preliminary objection,
stating “[w]hen the parties have been heard, the Court may decide
on the objection, or may join the objection to the merits, or may take
such other decision in regard to it as it considers just.”43
In the first reading, the last clause “or may take such other
decision . . . “ was deleted as it could be misunderstood that the
Court needed not to consider the objection,44 and the word “may”
was substituted by “shall.”45 Indeed, in the course of discussion on
the drafting of Article 38 of the 1926 Rules, Judge Anzilotti had
already suggested that unwarranted confusion should be avoided.46
In the last reading of Article 62 (March 5, 1936), it was noted that in
order to implement paragraph 5, a decision to overrule preliminary
objections or to join consideration of these objections to the merits
would require the Court to reset the time limit for the main

41
Prince von Pless Administration (Ger. v. Pol.), Order of 4 February, 1933
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 52, at 16.
42
Revised Statute and Rules of Court, 1940 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 1, at 53,
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-internationaljustice/serie_D/D_01_4e_edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJK8-YBXU].
43
Elaboration of the Rules of Court of March 11, 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) third
addendum to No. 2, at 85, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-ofinternational-justice/serie_D/D_02_3e_addendum.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6X2NGNU].
44 Id. at 95.
45 Id. at 150.
46
Acts and Documents concerning the Organization of the Court, 1926 P.C.I.J.
(ser. D) Addendum to No. 2, at 83, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanentcourtofinternationaljustice/serie_D/D_02_acts_and_doc_serie_d_add_to_n2.pdf.
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proceedings. 47 This revealed a gap in Article 62 regarding the
procedural response to the submission of preliminary objections.
Accordingly, “the proceedings on the merits shall be suspended”
was inserted into paragraph 3, and the newly added paragraph 5, as
rephrased, reads:
After hearing the parties the Court shall give its decision on
the objection or shall join the objection to the merits. If the
Court overrules the objection or joins it to the merits, it shall
once more fix time-limits for the further proceedings.48
In the practice of the Court, the decision envisaged in paragraph
5 may be rendered in the form of a judgment either to uphold or
overrule the preliminary objections,49 or in the form of an order to
join the consideration of the preliminary objection to the merits.50
The Court gave individual case numbers to these judgments and
orders. In doing so, the Court was clearly of the view that the
proceedings on an objection should be treated as an entirely separate
case.51
The 1946 Rules retained Article 62 of the 1936 Rules with slight
refinements in language. 52 The ICJ’s post-1946 practice led to a
major revision in 1972, in which the article on “preliminary
objections” was renumbered as Article 67, 53 with paragraphs

47
Elaboration of the Rules of Court of March 11, 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) third
addendum to No. 2.
48 Id. at 707-708.
49
Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v. Fr.), 1938 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 74 (June
14); Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Belg. v. Bulg.), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No. 77 (Order of Apr. 4); Borchgrave (Spain v. Belg.) 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 72 (Nov. 6).
50
Pajzs, Csáky, Esterhazy (Hung. v. Yugo.), 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 66
(Order of May 23); Losinger & Co. (Switz. v. Yugo.), 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 67
(Order of June 27); Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Est. v. Lith.), 1938 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No. 75 (Order of June 30).
51
Annual Report from 1939-1945, 1945 P.C.I.J. (ser. E) No. 16, at 190,
http://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-internationaljustice/serie_E/English/E_16_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJR5-JRD2] (“It was held
that the proceedings on an objection, even when resulting in the joinder of the
objection to the merits, could be regarded as a separate case, no matter they were
terminated by a judgement or by an order.”).
52
Rules of Court adopted on 6 May 1946. I.C.J. Acts & Docs. No. 1 (second
ed.), at 74-75.
53
Rules of Court came into force on 1 September 1972. I.C.J. Acts & Docs. No.
3, at 133-135.
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revised and added.54 Paragraph 5 of Article 62 of the 1946 Rules was
revised and renumbered as paragraph 7 of Article 67:
After hearing the parties, the Court shall give its decision in
the form of judgment, by which it shall either uphold the
objection, reject it, or declare that the objection does not
possess, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusively
preliminary character. If the Court rejects the objection or
declares that it does not possess an exclusively preliminary
character joins it to the merits, it shall once more fix timelimits for the further proceedings.55
This new rule for disposal of preliminary objections made two
fundamental changes. First, it excludes the option of “shall join the
objection to the merits” and instead forces the Court to rule on the
matter for or against, or alternatively declare that “the objection does
not possess an exclusively preliminary character.” 56 Second, it
explicitly requires that the Court dispose of the objection in the form
of a judgment.57 The rendering of a judgment is said to correspond
to the practice of the ICJ and is commonly regarded as appropriate
in view of the importance of such a decision on the preliminary
objection.58 Although the ICJ’s post-1946 practice no longer offers
an individual case number in disposing of a preliminary objection,
the 1972 revision rather enhanced the Court’s procedure that the
preliminary objection is to be dealt with as an entirely separate case
distinct from the proceeding on the merits.
The eight paragraphs in Article 67 of the 1972 Rules were
retained with minor drafting changes in Article 79 of the Rules of
1978.59 In the modification of Article 79 in 2001, paragraph 1 was
replaced by new paragraphs 1 to 3, and the former paragraphs 2 to
8 were retained unchanged and renumbered as paragraphs 4 to 10.60
In the application of Article 79, the Court held that “by raising
54
See id. (rewriting paragraph 1 (timing, etc.), retaining paragraph 2
(contents), retaining paragraphs 3 and 4 except for technical changes, and adding
new paragraphs 5, 6 and 8).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58
Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, The Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of
the International Court of Justice 67 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 20 (1973) (stating the
appropriateness of the requirement for the final decision on the preliminary
objection to be in the form of a judgment).
59
Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts & Docs.
60 Id.
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preliminary objections, it has made a procedural choice the effect of
which, according to the express terms of Article 79, paragraph 3
[Rules of 1978], is to suspend the proceedings on the merits.”61
Although the procedural choice suspends proceedings on the
merits, the choice to object carries its own requirements that
proceedings on the objection must be submitted timely and in
accordance with the Rules. The content and form of preliminary
objection were first specified in Paragraph 2 of Article 38 of the 1926
Rules,62 and the provision has been retained in subsequent revisions
with only technical changes.63 In the practice of the PCIJ, the Court
admitted that the preliminary objection was to be submitted in a
counter-memorial addressing both the preliminary objection and
points of argument on merits;64 it declined to condition the validity
of the objection on adherence to rigid formality.65
In the Nottebohm case, the non-appearing respondent sent a
communication, prior to its time limit for the filing of a countermemorial, challenging the jurisdiction of the Court. 66 The Court,
without invoking the Rules of Court on the preliminary objection,
nevertheless determined that a preliminary objection had been
raised in the aforesaid communication. Consequently, the Court
proceeded to examine only this preliminary objection and rendered
a judgment concerning it alone.67 In the second application of the
Barcelona Traction case, the Court clarified the effect of the filing of
the preliminary objection under the Rules as it gave “broad powers”
61
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
v. U.S.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. Rep. 134-35, para. 51.
62
Statute and Rules of Court, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 1, at 51 (“The document
submitting the objection shall contain a statement of facts and of law on which the
plea is based, a statement of conclusions and a list of the documents in support;
these documents shall be attached; it shall mention the evidence which the party
may desire to produce.”).
63
Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts & Docs, Paragraph 4, art. 79 of the 2001.
Amendment states, “The preliminary objection shall set out the facts and the law
on which the objection is based, the submissions and a list of the documents in
support; it shall mention any evidence which the party may desire to produce.
Copies of the supporting documents shall be attached.”
64 Pajzs‚ Csáky‚ Esterházy (Preliminary Objection: Order of 23 May 1936), supra
note 50, at 7.
65 Losinger (Preliminary Objection: Order of 27 June 1936), supra note 50, at 1819.
66
Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Preliminary Objection, 1953 I.C.J. Rep. 118
(Nov. 18).
67 Id.
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to the respondents, stating that “merely by labelling and filing a plea
as a preliminary objection they automatically bring about the
suspension of the proceedings on the merits.”68 The consequence is
that the Court will set a hearing under paragraph 5 of Article 62 of
the 1946 Rules and give consideration to its objection before
requiring a response on the merits.69
In contrast to form, timing is the defining factor as to whether a
plea constitutes a “preliminary” objection. The timing issue was
recognized as early as the drafting of the Rules of Court in 1922.70
Although the drafting judges failed to adopt any proposal for a rule
on the preliminary objection, there was a consensus among the
judges that objections to jurisdiction should be made as soon as
possible.71 The article on the preliminary objection (Article 38) of the
1926 Rules requires that a preliminary objection shall be filed after
the filing of the case (memorial) by the applicant and within the time
fixed for the filing of the counter-case (counter-memorial).72 In the
revised Rules of 1936, the starting point, “the filing of the Case
[Memorial]” was omitted, and the rule simply stated that
preliminary objection must be filed before the deadline for the
counter-memorial. 73 The issue of whether preliminary objections
can be submitted before the applicant files a memorial is less
controversial and appears to be settled in the affirmative.74 The time
68
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1964 I.C.J. Rep. 6 (July 24) (citing paragraph 3 of
Article 62).
69 Id. at paras. 9-10.
70
Preparation of the Rules of Court of January 30th, 1922 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No.
2, at 78, 149, 151, 202.
71 Id.
72
Statute and Rules of Court, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 1, at 50. (“When
proceedings are begun by means of an application, any preliminary objection shall
be filed after the filing of the Case [Memorial] by the applicant and within the time
fixed for the filing of the Counter-Case [Counter-Memorial].”).
73
Elaboration of the Rules of Court of March 11, 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) third
addendum to No. 2, at 1015. Paragraph 1 of Article 62 of the 1936 Rules states, “A
preliminary objection must be field at the latest before the expiry of the time-limit
fixed for the filing by the party submitting the objection of the first document of the
written proceedings to be filed by that party.” It is noted that in the practice of PCIJ
prior to the 1926 Rules of Court, the jurisdictional objections were raised in the early
stage in both the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, supra note 29, and
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case, supra note 32, with a
difference that objection was made subsequent to the filing of Memorial in the
former case but before in the latter case.
74
In the ICJ, the early submission of a preliminary objection is absolutely
proper. See Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.), Order of 13 December 1989,
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limit for the submission of a preliminary objection has been
redefined in the subsequent revision of the Rules of Court; the latest
modification of Article 79 (2001) defines the closing point to be three
months after the delivery of the Memorial or the delivery of a party’s
first pleading.75
Objections submitted after the time limit, under the Rules of
Court in force at the time, could not be accepted as properly
submitted preliminary objections, and would not have suspensory
effect on the main proceedings.76 Objections submitted before the
filing of the memorial—no longer a matter of restriction since the
Revision of Rules of Court in 1936—literally will also not have the
effect of suspension of the main proceedings since the latter has not
commenced. 77 However, the word suspension may be used
invariably as the Court did in the Certain German Interests in Polish
Upper Silesia case;78 the real meaning in this context is to indicate that
there will be an immediate and separate stage for the examination
of preliminary objections.79
The Court’s attention to jurisdiction may also be caught at the
very early stage, e.g., simultaneously with the request for
I.C.J. Rep. 134 (“Whereas, in accordance with Article 79, paragraph 1, of the Rules
of Court, while a respondent which wishes to submit a preliminary objection is
entitled before doing so to be informed as to the nature of the claim by the
submission of a Memorial by the Applicant, it may nevertheless file its objection
earlier.”).
75
Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts & Docs, art. 79.
76
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J.
Rep. 29, para. 24 (Mar. 31) (stating that the respondent filed its “preliminary
objections” more than four months after Mexico’s filing of its Memorial, and
therefore raised an issue concerning the three-month rule under art. 79(1) (2001
Modification). The Court was of the view that “a party failing to avail itself of the
Article 79 procedure may forfeit the right to bring about a suspension of the
proceedings.”). See also Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council
(India v. Pak.), Judgment, 1972 I.C.J. Rep. 53, para. 13 (Aug. 18) (stating no
preliminary procedure in this case, as “the objections were not put forward . . . as
‘preliminary’ objections under Article 62 of the Court’s Rules (1946 edition).”). The
Court was of the view that “[i]t is certainly to be desired that objections to the
jurisdiction of the Court should be put forward as preliminary objections for a
separate decision in advance of the proceedings on the merits.”).
77
ROSENNE, supra note 13, at 805. See also Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.),
Interim Protection Order, 1972 I.C.J. Rep. 12 (Aug. 17) (joint dissenting opinion of
Judges Bengzon and Jiménez de Aréchag).
78
See Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Preliminary
Objections: Judgement), supra note 32, at 15 (indicating that the consequence of the
objection was to suspend the proceedings on the merits of the suit, therefore it must
proceed to the preliminary objection).
79
ROSENNE, supra note 13, at 805.
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provisional measures, as the respondent challenges prima facie
jurisdiction on the merits of the dispute. However, it is not required,
and the respondent states would not be able to formulate a formal
preliminary objection due to urgency for such a request. In the
Interhandle case, the respondent (United States) in the provisional
measure phase filed a one-page brief titled “Preliminary Objection,”
referencing Article 62 of the 1946 Rules of Court governing
preliminary objections, and reserved its right to file separate further
preliminary objections. 80 This filing did not, however, have the
effect of automatically suspending the main proceedings until the
United States further submitted four preliminary objections with
appendices containing supporting exhibits.81
More challenging for the Court are cases of non-appearance in
which the Court’s attention to jurisdiction was caught by objections
raised in the provisional measure phase through so-called extraprocedural communications. 82 This occurred in several cases of
non-appearance in the 1970s and 1980s. In the case of United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, the Court found in the
provisional measures phase that it was manifest from the
information before the Court that the jurisdiction of the Court could
Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), Interim Measures, 1957 I.C.J. Rep.107 (Oct. 24).
See id. at 123 (failing to mention Article 62 of the Rules of Court, the Court
fixed time limits for the filing of the memorial, counter memorial or any preliminary
objections of the United States. The United Stated filed within the time limit four
preliminary objections with appendixes of a list of exhibits); see also Interhandel
(Switz. v. U.S.), Order, 1958 I.C.J. Rep. 32 (June 26) (referencing Article 62 of the
Rules of Court, fixed the time limit for the applicant to present a written statement
of its observations and submissions in regard to the preliminary objections). Two
reasons may be considered as to why the initial one-page filing in the stage of
provisional measures did not trigger immediate suspension: (1) the main
proceeding has not commenced and (2) the United States explicitly reserved the
right to file separate further preliminary objections.
82 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, para. 27 (June 27) (announcing in each and
every case that non-appearance was regretful. In no case did the Court declare
extra-procedural communications invalid, or sanction the act of non-appearance);
see also Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, 1978 I.C.J. Rep.
18, para. 42 (Dec. 19) (stating that the Court must take into account all the elements
before it, including the non-appearing party’s extra-procedural communication. In
doing so the Court explicitly referred to Article 53 of the Statute of the Court.); but
cf. Sir G. Fitzmaurice, The Problem of the “Non-Appearing” Defendant Government 51
BRITISH YEARBOOK INT’L L. 89, 120-21 (1980) (examining the problem of the “nonappearing” defendant through ICJ cases and concluding that it may bring the
court’s obligatory jurisdiction into disrepute; speaking against the practice of nonappearance and suggesting that in managing procedural matters the Court shall
not take judicial cognizance of extra-procedural communications).
80
81
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be established.83 In Fisheries Jurisdiction, Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of
War, Nuclear Tests, and Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, the Court
determined in its orders that the first pleadings should be addressed
to the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the
dispute, with fixed time-limits for the submission of pleadings for
that purpose.84
In these orders, no reference was made to the article governing
preliminary objections in the Rules of Court then in force, similar to
the practice of the court in the Nottebohm case.85 The first order of
this kind was made in the 1972 Fisheries Jurisdiction case, when the
then applicable Article 62 in the 1946 Rules of Court was undergoing
a modification during the course of the adjudication to require the
submission of objections to be made in the form of “pleadings.”86
The Court later ruled in its Judgments on Preliminary Objections
that a non-appearing party’s extra-procedural communications
could not be treated as a “pleading” under the Rules of Court. 87
While in the Nottebohm case, the extra-procedural communication
was submitted prior to its time limit for the filing of a countermemorial and the Court recognized that preliminary objection had
83 See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
Provisional Measures, 1979 I.C.J. Rep. 14, para. 18 (Dec. 15) (stating that the Court
only ordered that the case should proceed according to its normal course, i.e.,
memorial of the United States is to be filed first and the counter-memorial of Iran
second); see also U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 24, para. 45 (May 24) (discussing how the objections from
Iran were examined in the main proceedings and decided in the judgment on
merits).
84 See generally Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Order, 1972, I.C.J. Rep. 182
(Aug. 18); Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ger. v. Ice.), Order, 1972, I.C.J. Rep. 189 (Aug. 18);
Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pak. v. India), Order, 1973 I.C.J. Rep. 330 (July
13); Nuclear Tests (Aust. v. Fr.), Order, 1973 I.C.J. Rep. 106 (June 22); Nuclear Tests
(N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1973 I.C.J Rep. 142 (June 22); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
(Greece v. Turkey), Order, 1976 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (Sept. 11); Aegean Sea Continental
Shelf (Greece v. Turkey) Order, 1976 I.C.J. Rep. 43 (Oct. 14) (providing in its orders
that the first pleadings should first address the Court’s own jurisdiction within
certain time limits).
85
Nottebohm, supra note 66 and accompanying text.
86 See supra note 53, (quoting Article 67 (5) of the 1972 Rules of Court: “The
statements of fact and law in the pleadings referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 above,
and the statements and evidence presented at the hearings contemplated by
paragraph 4, shall be confined to those matters that are relevant to the objection.”).
87 See Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Jurisdiction of the Court, 1973 I.C.J.
Rep. 6, ¶ 10 (Feb. 2); Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ger. v. Ice.), Jurisdiction of the Court,
1973 I.C.J. Rep. 54, ¶ 13 (Feb. 2). The Court affirmed this point in a subsequent case
of non-appearance; see also Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey),
Questions of Jurisdiction and/or Admissibility, 1978 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ¶ 14 (Dec. 19).
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been raised in the said communication, under the revised 1972
Rules, there is no space for the Court to recognize that preliminary
objections can be properly raised by extra-procedural
communications. 88 In all these cases, the respondent states
presented such communications in the provisional measures stage
in which the Court may simply grant bifurcation.
In these cases, the Court offered a post facto justification of its
decision to consider the matter of jurisdiction on its own initiative,
reasoning that it was supported by a statutory duty under Article 53
of the Statute of the Court, which requires the Court to “satisfy
itself” that it has jurisdiction if a party fails to appear.89 However,
Article 53 was not referenced in the aforementioned orders. Indeed,
the Court’s reliance on Article 53 does not appear proper at this
stage in the proceedings since the respondent’s non-appearance has
yet to be ascertained until the time limit for submission of its first
pleadings has passed.90 In any event, Article 53 does not have preemptory effect on a procedural order issued at the stage of
provisional measures even if it concerns jurisdiction. This point is
quite clear by reference of the Court’s handling of the respondent’s
objections raised in extra-communication in the merits in the case of
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran.91
Therefore, an outstanding objection presented at the provisional
measures stage—not necessarily limited to non-appearing party’s
extra-procedural communications—may facilitate the Court’s
decision to bifurcate proceedings without waiting for further
submission of a preliminary objection, as occurred in the Nicaragua
case. 92 In such cases the Court exercised its inherent power to
manage procedural issues to cope with circumstances not envisaged
in the preliminary objection rule in force at the time.93 Or, if the
Rules of Court came into force on 1 September 1972, supra note 53.
Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Jurisdiction of the Court, 1973 I.C.J. Rep.
7, para. 12 (Feb. 2); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment (Greece v. Turkey),
Questions of Jurisdiction and/or Admissibility, 1978 I.C.J. Rep. 7, paras. 14-15 (Dec.
19).
90
ROSENNE, supra note 13, at 851.
91
U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, supra note 83.
92
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Order, 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 187 (May 10).
93
Nuclear Tests (Aust. v. Fr.), Questions of Jurisdiction and/or Admissibility,
1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253, ¶¶ 22-23 (Dec. 20). This practice was later reflected in the 2001
amendment to Article 79 of the Rules of Court. In paragraph 2 the Court states:
“Notwithstanding paragraph 1 above, following the submission of the application
and after the President has met and consulted with the parties, the Court may
decide that any questions of jurisdiction and admissibility shall be determined
88
89
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parties in the early stage of the proceedings, which in practice
follows the submission of the application but precedes the first
pleading, agree that the issues of jurisdiction and admissibility
should be dealt with at a preliminary stage of the proceedings, the
Court has in the past given effect to such agreements.94
In these cases, prevalent since the 1970s, the Court has
established a practice of evaluating jurisdiction issues separately
from the main proceedings without the parties raising preliminary
objections. 95 This practice of bifurcation was characterized by
commentators as “isolation of jurisdiction.”96
However, if the Court elects to wait to address jurisdictional
issues, the respondent state is entitled to raise preliminary objections
within the time limit prescribed under Article 79 of the Rules of
Court. 97 Ultimately, a party has the privilege to secure a selfcontained proceeding on jurisdiction and admissibility unless it
decides not to do so by failing to raise a timely objection or agrees
that preliminary objections be heard and determined within the
proceedings on the merits. 98 From the 1972 Rules onwards, the
separately.” The new art. 79(2) was applied in the following two cases: Obligations
concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to
Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. India), Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
Judgment, 2016 I.C.J. Rep. 255, and Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to
Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Islands
v. Pak.), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, 2016 I.C.J. Rep. 552.
94
Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), Order, 1986 I.C.J.
Rep. 552; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), Order, 1991 I.C.J. Rep. 50; Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v.
Can.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 87; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Burundi), Order, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 1019; Armed Activities on
the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), Order, 1999 I.C.J. Rep.
1026.
95 See supra notes 84, 91-94.
96
ROSENNE, supra note 13, at 856-62. In the case of “isolation of jurisdiction,”
written pleadings are designated as “memorial” and “counter-memorial,” as
opposed to the “Preliminary Objections” and the “Written Statement of
Observations and Submissions.” See Dietmar W. Prager, The 2001 Amendments to
the Rules of Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1 L. & PRACTICE INT’L CTS. &
TRIBUNALS 155, 168 (2002) (explaining that the new rule gives the Court the power
to determine jurisdiction and admissibility before any proceedings on the merits).
97 See Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg.), Order, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 989;
Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg.), Order, 2000 I.C.J. Rep. 149 (fixing time
limit for filing of the preliminary objections).
98 See Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), Order, 1956 I.C.J. Rep. 74 (May
29) (stating that preliminary objections were formally raised, but the parties
subsequently agreed to have these objections decided together with the merits. The
Court joined the objections the merits). A new provision that such an agreement
“shall be given effect by the Court” was added to art. 67(8) of the Rules of Court
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consequence of a preliminary objection submitted in due course is
comprehensively described by Paragraph 3 (suspension of the main
proceedings and a written proceeding addressing objections, now
paragraph 5 of the 2001 Amendment), Paragraph 4 (a default oral
hearing on preliminary objections, now Paragraph 6), and
Paragraph 7 (disposal of preliminary objections in the form of
judgement, now Paragraph 9). 99 This rule-based approach to
bifurcation is clearly resolved in the modern Rules of Court.100
3.

THE MATTER OF BIFURCATION IN UNCLOS ANNEX VII
ARBITRATION

Since UNCLOS entered into force in 1994, 14 cases have been
adjudicated under Annex VII Arbitration. 101 ICSID served as
Registrar for the first case, the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, where the
parties agreed that Japan’s preliminary objections to jurisdiction
would be addressed in one round of submissions in writing,
followed by a hearing, all in accordance with the agreed schedule.102
This proceeding was disposed of by a separate award on jurisdiction
and admissibility, in which the tribunal upheld an objection to
jurisdiction and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the
dispute.103

(1972) and retained in the 1978 Revision and renumbered as art. 79 (10) (2001
Amendment); Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. It.), 1987 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Order
of Mar. 2); East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 91 (Order of June 30), para.
4 (June 30); Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2000 I.C.J.
Rep. 182 (Order of Dec. 8), 236. But cf. id. at 121 (explaining that this rule shall not
be subject to unilateral modification).
99
Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts & Docs.
100
See, e.g., Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Som. v. Kenya),
Judgment, 2017 I.C.J. Rep. 3, para. 5 (Feb. 2017) (explaining that proceedings on the
merits had been suspended until resolving jurisdictional objections).
101
Southern Bluefin Tuna (Austl. v. Japan); MOX Plant case; Barb. v. Trin. &
Tobago; Guy. v. Surin.; Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arb. (Bangl. v. India);
Chagos Marine Protected Area Arb.; “Enrica Lexie” Incident; Atlanto-Scandian
Herring Arb.; Arctic Sunrise (Neth. v. Russ.); South China Sea Arb. (Phil. v. China);
ARA Libertad Arb. (Arg. v. Ghana), Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the
Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukr. v. Russ.); Duzgit Integrity Arb.; and
Land Reclamation by Singapore in and Around the Straits of Johor.
102
Southern Bluefin Tuna (Austl. v. Japan), Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility (2004) 23 Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 5, para. 7.
103 Id. at para. 72.
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The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) served as Registrar
in the remaining thirteen cases, publishing the tribunal’s Rules of
Procedure on the PCA website in 11 of these cases.104 Provisions
under the heading “Preliminary Objection” in these 11 published
rules can be categorized into three types. Seven of these cases
provide the tribunals with discretion on the matter of bifurcation.105
Two of them are identical articles adopted by the tribunals in the
two non-appearance cases, which are, in principle, in favor of
bifurcation. 106 The final two cases incorporate key elements of
Article 79 of the ICJ’s Rules of Court (one is the pending Dispute
Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch
Strait).107 For the two cases in which Rules of Procedure were not
published, proceedings were stayed while the parties reached a
settlement and jointly requested the tribunal to deliver a final award
binding upon the parties pursuant to their agreement.108 In Duzgit
Integrity Arbitration, the respondent submitted its preliminary
objections and made a request for bifurcation.109 The tribunal, after
soliciting comments from the applicant and hearing the views of the
parties, rejected this request.110 This mini-proceeding on bifurcation
will be discussed throughout this Chapter.
Now we look at these rules and the practice of the tribunals on
the matter of bifurcation. We consider each category of cases in turn,
drawing on specific cases as examples.

104
MOX Plant case; Barb. v. Trin. & Tobago; Guy. v. Surin.; Bay of Bengal
Maritime Boundary Arb. (Bangl. v. India), Chagos Marine Protected Area Arb.,
“Enrica Lexie” Incident, Atlanto-Scandian Herring Arb., Arctic Sunrise (Neth. v.
Russ); South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China); ARA Libertad Arb. (Arg. v.
Ghana), Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and
Kerch Strait (Ukr. v. Russ.). The Rules of Procedure were not published in Duzgit
Integrity Arb. and Land Reclamation by Singapore in and Around the Straits of
Johor.
105
MOX Plant case; Barb. v. Trin. & Tobago; Guy. v. Surin., Bay of Bengal
Maritime Boundary Arb. (Bangl. v. India); Chagos Marine Protected Area Arb.;
“Enrica Lexie” Incident; Atlanto-Scandian Herring Arb.
106
The Arctic Sunrise case (Neth. v. Russ.); South China Sea Arb. (Phil. v.
China).
107
ARA Libertad Arb. (Arg. v. Ghana); Dispute Concerning Coastal State
Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukr. v. Russ.).
108 See Land Reclamation by Singapore in and Around the Straits of Johor
(Malay. v. Sing.), 45 I.L.M. (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005) (deciding that in light of the joint
request by the Parties that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to render the Award).
109
Duzgit Integrity Arb. (Malta v. São Tomé & Príncipe), (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2016).
110 Id.
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3.1. Discretionary bifurcation in the Rules of Procedure and no
bifurcation in practice
The MOX Plant case was the first case initiated under Annex VII
Arbitration that PCA served as Registrar. Article 11(3) of the Rules
of Procedure provides: “The tribunal may rule on objections . . . as
a preliminary question or it may proceed with the arbitration and
rule on such an objection in its final award (emphasis added).”111
The tribunals in the following five cases adopted the articles on
preliminary objection corresponding mutatis mutandis to Article
11(3) of the MOX Plant Rules of Procedure: Barbados v. Trinidad and
Tobago, 112 Guyana v. Suriname, 113 Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary
Arbitration between Bangladesh and India, 114 Chagos Marine Protected
Area Arbitration,115 and “Enrica Lexie” Incident.116 Significantly, the
PAC’s Model Rules of Procedure also provide the same discretion
to an arbitral tribunal on the matter of bifurcation.117

111

11(3).
112

10(3).

MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), Rules of Procedure, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2001), art.
Barb. v. Trin. & Tobago, Rules of Procedure, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2004), art.

Guy. v. Surin., Rules of Procedure, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2004), art. 10(3).
Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arb. (Bangl. v. India), Rules of
Procedure, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009) art. 10(3).
115
Chagos Marine Protected Area Arb. (Mauritius v. U.K.), Rules of
Procedures, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012), art. 11(3).
116
”Enrica Lexie” Incident, (It. v. India), Rules of Procedure, (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2016), art. 10(4) (Jan. 2016).
117
Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States, (Perm. Ct.
Arb.
2012),
art.
21(4),
https://pca-cpa.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/175/2016/01/Optional-Rules-for-Arbitrating-Disputesbetween-Two-States_1992.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8X4-FFXK]; Arbitration Rules
(effective Dec. 17, 2012), (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012), art. 23(3), https://pca-cpa.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/175/2015/11/PCA-Arbitration-Rules-2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5P7M-Q59G]. Since the P.C.A. is more frequently used for
international commercial arbitrations, we may assume that the P.C.A.’s model
Arbitration Rules reflect the practice of international commercial arbitrations. In
this regard, we find the same provision also in Article 23(3) in the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rule, see UNCITRAL Arbitration Rule (as revised in 2010),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arbrules-revised-2010-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4MU-SNUZ].
In international
commercial arbitrations, tribunals have the power to decide on the matter of
bifurcation according to their rules of arbitration, or they shall have discretion on
this matter in exercising their inherent judicial function in the absence of any
explicit provision. See generally Vojtěch Trapl, Thinking Big—Bifurcation of
Arbitration Proceedings—To Bifurcate or Not To Bifurcate, 4 CZECH YEARBOOK PUB. &
113
114
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The Rules of Procedure of Atlanto-Scandian Herring Arbitration do
not explicitly provide that the tribunal may either rule on objections
as a preliminary issue or in its final award.118 However, Article 12,
under the heading “Preliminary Objections and Stay of
Proceedings,” provides in Paragraph 3:
Upon receipt of a preliminary objection under paragraph
2(a) the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide by a reasoned
Procedural Order, promptly after having heard the Parties
orally by way of a meeting, whether to order bifurcation or
to decline to order bifurcation and to reserve the preliminary
objections for the final Award.119
With this mini proceeding on the question of bifurcation (rather
than on questions of jurisdiction or admissibility), the tribunal
maintains discretionary power on the question of bifurcation. This
matter will be dealt with subsequently.
In the abovementioned seven cases, the tribunals only had a
chance to consider the issue of bifurcation in the Guyana v. Suriname
case and Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration. In the other five
cases, preliminary objections were either not raised (two cases),120 or
the issue of bifurcation did not come out as an issue for other reasons
(three cases).121
PRIVATE INT’L L. 267 (2013); Massimo V. Benedettelli, To Bifurcate or Not To Bifurcate?
That is the (Ambiguous) Question, 29 ARB. INT’L 493 (2013).
118
Atlanto-Scandian Herring Arb. (Den. v. EU), Rules of Procedure, PCA Case
Repository, art. 12(3) (Mar. 2014).
119 Id.
120 See Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arb. (Bangl. v. India), PCA Case
Repository (2014) (noting that India did not raise preliminary objections in its
counter memorial); “Enrica Lexie” Incident (It. v. India), Case No. 2015-28,
Procedural
Order
No.
3
(Perm.
Ct.
Arb.
2017),
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2145
[https://perma.cc/VJ4N-FVXP]
(noting that India did not submit preliminary objections within the time limit).
121 See MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), Procedural Order No. 3, para. 29 (Perm.
Ct.
Arb.
2003),
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/867
[https://perma.cc/N9T5-XK3U] (holding that it was unnecessary to decide
whether to bifurcate the case at that time because the arbitration was being
conducted under Article 8 of the Rules but not Article 11 on Preliminary Objection;
MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), Procedural Order No. 6 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2003),
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/870
[https://perma.cc/V583-M763]
(announcing that Ireland has withdrawn the case and the case was terminated);
Atlanto-Scandian Herring Arb. (Den. v. Eur.), Case No. 2013-30, Procedural Order
No. 2 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/784
[https://perma.cc/9U6Z-WLZV] (staying the proceedings at the early stage under
the agreement of the parties); Atlanto-Scandian Herring Arb. (Den. v. Eur.), Case
No.
2013-30,
Termination
Order
(Perm.
Ct.
Arb.
2014),
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In Guyana v. Suriname, upon receiving the preliminary objection
submitted by Suriname, the tribunal invited the parties to submit
their views in writing and then arranged a two-day meeting to hear
arguments on the issue of bifurcation.122 This informal proceeding
on the matter of bifurcation was not specified in Article 10 of the
tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, but was rather initiated by the
tribunal probably within the meaning of Article 10(3), directing the
tribunal to ascertain the views of the parties before deciding whether
to rule on objections to jurisdiction or admissibility issues as a
preliminary determination or in its final award.123 Therefore, the
submissions in writing and a hearing in this mini-proceeding dealt
with the question of whether the objections were “said to be
preliminary (or exclusively preliminary) in character”; the tribunal,
on the basis that “the objections are not of an exclusively preliminary
character,” decided in its No. 2 Order, in accordance with Article
10(3) of its Rules of Procedure, to rule on Suriname’s preliminary
objections to jurisdiction and admissibility in its final award.124
In Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration, Article 11
(Preliminary Objection) of the tribunal’s Rules of Procedure
explicitly provided one round of submission in writing on the
question of bifurcation, and a one-day hearing on the matter. 125
Under this mini-proceeding, the written submissions and the
hearing are confined to the question of bifurcation and do not
directly address jurisdiction or admissibility.126 In its No. 2 Order,
the tribunal rejected the United Kingdom’s request for bifurcation

https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/781
[https://perma.cc/GBK7-5KWY]
(terminating the stay by agreement of the parties); Barb. v. Trin. & Tobago, Case
No.
2004-02,
Award
(Perm.
Ct.
Arb.
2006),
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1116
[https://perma.cc/74VA-VG7E]
(noting that the respondent State asked the tribunal to join its preliminary
objections to the merits to be determined in the tribunal’s final award).
122 See Guy. v. Surin., Case No. 2004-04, Award, paras. 40-48 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2007), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/902 [https://perma.cc/D72Y4YPQ].
123 See id.
124 See Guy. v. Surin., Case No. 2004-04, Order No. 2 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005),
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/884 [https://perma.cc/C68K-8DMN].
125 See Chagos Marine Protected Area Arb. (Mauritius v. U.K.), supra note 115,
Rules of Procedures, art. 11(4)-(5) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2011).
126 See id.
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and decided that the preliminary objections would be considered
with the proceedings on the merits.127
This mini-proceeding on the question of bifurcation was also
implemented by the tribunal in Duzgit Integrity Arbitration, who, in
its No. 2 Order, rejected the respondent’s request for bifurcation (the
PCA did not publish the tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, or its No. 2
Order).128
In contrast to Guyana v. Suriname, the tribunal of Chagos Marine
Protected Area Arbitration and the tribunal of Duzgit Integrity
Arbitration rejected the respondents’ request for bifurcation without
giving any reason as to whether or not the objection possessed an
exclusively preliminary character. 129 Rather, it indicated that the
preliminary character of an objection was at most a factor for
consideration within the tribunal’s discretion in the implementation
of the mini-proceedings on bifurcation. In Guyana v. Suriname, if the
tribunal found that the objection possessed an exclusively
preliminary character, it remains to be seen whether the tribunal,
while still retaining the discretion explicitly provided by its Rules of
Procedure, would bifurcate the proceedings without taking into
consideration other circumstances, e.g., efficiency of the ad hoc
arbitration (see the discussion in Chapter 4).
In each of the cases, when a respondent raised its preliminary
objection, a mini-proceeding on the matter of bifurcation was
followed without suspension of the main proceedings.130
The mini proceeding was within the tribunal’s discretion on
bifurcation, even when the mini proceeding was not specified in the
Rules of Procedure. The format of the mini proceedings varied
across the three cases; some permitted only oral arguments, while
others required submissions in writing in addition to a hearing.
When narrowly examining the question of bifurcation, however, the
tribunals consider a variety of factors in exercising their discretion.
127 See Chagos Marine Protected Area Arb. (Mauritius v. U.K.), Case No. 201103,
Procedural
Order
No.
2
(Perm.
Ct.
Arb.
2013),
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1795 [https://perma.cc/6L95-R94P].
128 See Duzgit Integrity Arb., supra note 109.
129 See Chagos Marine Protected Area Arb., supra note 127; Duzgit Integrity
Arb., supra note 109.
130 See Guy. v. Surin., supra note 113 (providing a clear example of the tribunal
deciding to undertake a mini-proceeding on bifurcation without suspending its
main proceeding). In fact, resolution of the question of bifurcation in the three cases
was reached within approximately two months from the submission of preliminary
objections; the original timetable for the submission of pleadings and the
scheduling of hearings were barely affected.
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The question of whether an objection possesses an exclusively
preliminary character was not indispensable to the bifurcation
inquiry, though sometimes it dominated the reasoning for nonbifurcation. In the mini proceedings, deliberation on bifurcation did
not permit an argument on jurisdiction and admissibility to be fully
debated; therefore, the tribunals at this stage could not adjudicate
questions of jurisdiction or admissibility that had been raised as
preliminary objections. Unlike the ICJ, the tribunals cannot render
a separate judgment (award) to dispose of preliminary objections,
including a judgment (award) declaring that the preliminary
objection does not possess an exclusively preliminary character.
At the conclusion of the mini proceedings in the three abovementioned cases, the tribunals made decisions on the question of
bifurcation in the form of procedural orders – but all ended with
rejections to the requests for bifurcation. The mini proceeding
concluding with a procedural order necessarily constitutes a kind of
procedural response to a duly raised preliminary objection.
However, it is a procedure for deliberation on bifurcation only, so
the tribunal cannot adjudicate the preliminary objection. In contrast,
under Article 79 of the ICJ’s Rules of Court, a party that duly submits
its preliminary objections will have the Court adjudicate on
questions raised therein, with no proceedings on the matter of
bifurcation.131 This is the fundamental procedural difference when
responding to a duly submitted preliminary objection.
3.2. The matter of bifurcation in two cases of non-appearance
In South China Sea Arbitration and Arctic Sunrise, the tribunals,
having been constituted without participation of the respondents,132
adopted Rules of Procedure to address potential non-appearance.133
Both sets of Rules adopted an identical Article 20 containing four
See Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts & Docs, art. 79.
See UNCLOS, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. at Annex VII
art. 3(c), (e) (discussing the appointment of members to an arbitral tribunal).
133
The respective Rules of Procedure for these two cases of non-appearance
set forth identical Article 25 provisions on “Failure to Appear or to Make
Submissions.” See The Arctic Sunrise Arb. (Neth. v. Russ.), Rules of Procedure,
PCA
Case
Repository,
art.
25
(Mar.
17,
2014),
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1317
[https://perma.cc/SZK5AW9C]; South China Sea Arb. (Phil. v. China), Rules of Procedure, PCA Case
Repository (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/233
[https://perma.cc/3GSC-53U9].
131
132
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paragraphs regarding “Preliminary Objections.”134 The deadline for
raising a plea concerning jurisdiction is “no later than in the
Counter-Memorial.” 135 A later plea may be admitted by the
tribunals, 136 though it is not clear whether raising an objection to
jurisdiction in an extra-procedural communication would constitute
such a plea.137 The ensuing paragraphs of Article 20 read as follows:
The Arbitral Tribunal shall rule on any plea concerning its
jurisdiction as a preliminary question, unless the Arbitral
Tribunal determines, after seeking the views of the Parties,
that the objection to its jurisdiction does not possess an
exclusively preliminary character, in which case it shall rule
on such a plea in conjunction with the merits.
Prior to a ruling on any matters relating to jurisdiction or
admissibility, a hearing shall be held if the Arbitral Tribunal
determines that such a hearing is necessary or useful, after
seeking the views of the Parties.138
In Arctic Sunrise, within three weeks of the initiation of the
arbitration, Russia objected to jurisdiction in an extra-procedural
communication and provided justification of non-appearance, on
the basis of Article 298 of the UNCLOS. 139 The Netherlands
requested provisional measures from ITLOS since the arbitral
tribunal was yet-to-be constituted.140 Russia’s communication was
134 See The Arctic Sunrise Arb. (Neth. v. Russ.), Rules of Procedure, PCA Case
Repository, art. 20 (Mar. 17, 2014); South China Sea Arb. (Phil. v. China), Rules of
Procedure, PCA Case Repository, art. 20 (Aug. 27, 2013).
135 See id. art. 20(2).
136 See id. (“A plea that the Arbitral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall
be raised no later than in the Counter-Memorial . . . The Arbitral Tribunal may, in
either case, admit a later plea if it considers the delay justified”).
137
Note that in ICJ cases, objections raised in extra-procedural
communications can no longer be taken as formal “pleading” under the article on
preliminary objections since Fisheries Jurisdiction. See Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v.
Ice.), supra note 87, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ger. v. Ice.), supra note 87 and
accompanying text (highlighting the Court’s continued manifestation of this
approach).
138 See The Arctic Sunrise Arb. Rules of Proc., supra note 133, art. 20(3)-(4); The
South China Sea Arb. Rules of Proc., supra note 133, art. 20(3)-(4).
139 See The Arctic Sunrise Arb. (Neth. v. Russ.), Award on the Merits, PCA
Case
Repository,
para.
5
(Aug.
14,
2015),
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1438 [https://perma.cc/HX9E-8HUK].
140 See UNCLOS, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. at art. 290(5)
(articulating the circumstances required for such a request to be entertained by
ITLOS).
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evaluated by ITLOS when ITLOS considered prescribing
provisional measures.141 ITLOS, however, could not prescribe any
procedural arrangement on the matter of bifurcation because
procedural prescriptions regarding bifurcation are only within the
purview of the arbitral tribunal. After the constitution of the arbitral
tribunal, the applicant, Netherlands, requested bifurcation in its
Memorial. 142 The Netherlands saw this as the appropriate
procedural response to Russia’s extra-procedural communication,
and the tribunal offered Russia the opportunity to comment on
applicants’ request.143 In its No. 4 Procedural Order, the tribunal
determined that Russia’s extra-procedural communication
effectively constituted “a plea concerning this Arbitral Tribunal’s
jurisdiction to which Article 20(3) of the Rules of Procedure applies,
and such a plea possesses an exclusively preliminary character.”144
The tribunal then decided to “rule on this plea concerning its
jurisdiction as a preliminary question without holding a hearing.”145
In South China Sea Arbitration, from the time the arbitration was
initiated, China persistently held that it did not accept the
arbitration.146 Nevertheless, the tribunal set a deadline for China’s
submission of its Counter-Memorial. 147 A week before China’s
submission was due, China published a Position Paper of the
Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of
Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the
Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter “China’s Position Paper”),
in which China argued three major objections to the tribunal’s
141 See The “Arctic Sunrise” Case, (Neth. v. Russ.), Case No. 22, Order of Nov.
22, 2013, ITLOS Rep. 240, para. 42.
142 See The Arctic Sunrise Arb. (Neth. v. Russ.), Case No. 2014-02, Proc. Order
No.
4
(Bifurcation),
§
1
(Perm.
Ct.
Arb.
2014),
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1324
[https://perma.cc/BV37P327].
143 See id. at 3.
144 See id. at 3.
145 See id.
146 See Letter from The Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the
Republic of the Philippines to the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
the
Philippines
(Feb.
19,
2013),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2165478/phl-prc-china-noteverbale.pdf [https://perma.cc/GX5C-LX3X] [hereinafter Letter from PRC to
Philippines 2013] (“China therefore rejects and returns the Philippines’ Note Verbal
No 13-0211 and the attached Notification.”).
147 See The South China Sea Arb. (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Proc. Order
No.2,
at
3,
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1805
[https://perma.cc/9BAC-RXTJ].
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jurisdiction. 148 In the Position Paper, however, no request for
bifurcation was explicitly made. 149 The tribunal invited the
Philippines to comment on, among other things, a possible
bifurcation of the proceedings. 150 The Philippines replied to the
tribunal that bifurcation would be “neither appropriate or
desirable,” since “the jurisdictional issues . . . are plainly interwoven
with the merits.”151 In the operative part of its No. 4 Procedural
Order, the tribunal considered China’s extra-procedural
communications to effectively constitute a plea concerning the
tribunal’s jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 20 of the Rules of
Procedure and decided to bifurcate the proceedings.152 The tribunal
reserved the issue of whether jurisdictional objections possess
exclusively preliminary character, to be determined later in the
hearing on jurisdiction.153
Under these tribunals’ identical Article 20(3) of Rules of
Procedure, tribunals “shall rule on any plea concerning its
jurisdiction as a preliminary question, unless the Arbitral Tribunal
determines . . . that the objection to its jurisdiction does not possess
an exclusively preliminary character, in which case it shall rule on
such a plea in conjunction with the merits.” 154 The procedural
response to a plea, in principle, is bifurcation, which does not
necessarily require any decision. The only explicit exception to this
principle applies if the tribunal determines that the objection to its

148
See MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
POSITION PAPER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE
MATTER OF JURISDICTION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION INITIATED BY THE
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
(2014)
at
¶
86,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1368895.htm
[https://perma.cc/CZG5-C447]
[hereinafter
“China’s
Position
Paper”]
(articulating the reasoning for concluding that the Arbitral Tribunal does not have
jurisdiction over this case).
149 See id. ¶ 3.
150 See The South China Sea Arb. (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Proc. Order
No.4,
at
¶
4
(Perm.
Ct.
Arb.
2015),
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1807%3E%203
[https://perma.cc/XJJ2-SYS5].
151 See id.
152
See id. §§ 1.1-1.3 (discussing the circumstances and the Tribunal’s
determination regarding bifurcation).
153
See id. § 2.2 (identifying the Tribunal’s determination regarding its
approach to considerations of jurisdictional objections that do not possess an
exclusively preliminary character).
154 See The Arctic Sunrise Arb. Rules of Proc., supra note 133, art. 20(3), The
South China Sea Arb. Rules of Proc., supra note 133, art. 20(3).
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jurisdiction does not possess an exclusively preliminary character.155
According to Article 20(3), the tribunal may decide on the matter of
bifurcation in the form of procedural order, in which it shall
exclusively address the question of exception and nothing else
(other circumstantial factors such as efficiency etc.). 156 For this
purpose, the decision must, therefore, be “prior to a ruling on any
matters relating to jurisdiction or admissibility,” though a hearing
shall be held if the tribunal finds it necessary or useful.157 A mini
proceeding on bifurcation becomes possible, but remains confined
to the question of exception. A mini proceeding can be regarded as
a procedural response to the objection raised in a party’s extraprocedural communication if the tribunal considers it as a plea.
However, the tribunal at this stage cannot adjudicate jurisdictional
questions raised by such a plea.
In Arctic Sunrise, the applicant, the Netherlands, in its request for
bifurcation, did not raise the question of exception, but the tribunal
stated in its order for bifurcation that there was no exception.158 In
South China Sea Arbitration, China did not explicitly request
bifurcation in its extra-procedural communication in which it did
timely raised objection concerning the tribunal’s jurisdiction.159 The
tribunal neglected the question of exception in its order for
bifurcation and reserved the matter to be considered and decided in
the proceedings on preliminary objections.160 The tribunal stated in
its Award on Jurisdiction that some of China’s objections did not
possess an exclusively preliminary character.161 Since this question
is reserved to the preliminary phase where parties are supposed to
contest jurisdiction exclusively, the tribunal interpreted and applied
Article 20 of the Rules of Procedures in a way similar to Article 79 of
See id.
See id.
157 See id. art. 20(4).
158 See Arctic Sunrise Arb. Proc. Order No. 4, supra note 142, ¶ 2 (discussing
the Court’s explanation in light of Netherlands’ approach).
159 See supra note 149.
160
See South China Sea Arb. Proc. Order No. 4, supra note 150, ¶ 2.2
(explaining the outcome of the tribunal’s deliberations on the question).
161 See The South China Sea Arb. (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Award on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶¶ 398, 399, 402, 405, 406, 409, 411 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2015),
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1506
[https://perma.cc/5588-YPAX] (concluding that possible jurisdictional objections
with respect to the dispute underlying some of the Philippines’ Submission do not
possess an exclusively preliminary character, reserves decisions on its jurisdiction
with respect to the Philippines’ Submissions in conjunction with the merits).
155
156
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the ICJ Rules of Court. However, as the decision on bifurcation
manifested by a procedural order depends only on the question of
exception under Article 20(3), deferring this question to the
preliminary proceeding raises questions about why bifurcation was
ordered and whether this mini-proceeding and order on bifurcation
was necessary.
For both cases of non-appearance, the tribunals’ bifurcation
orders were issued after the expiration of the deadline for
respondent’s submission, 162 or after respondent’s decision to not
submit a counter-memorial. 163 With their bifurcation orders,
respondents’ non-appearance becomes a fact to the tribunals. Only
in the South China Sea Arbitration did the bifurcation order reference
Annex VII Article 9 (addressing non-appearance) in its preamble in
addition to referencing other matters as circumstantial factors; the
order also explicitly referred to the ICJ practice of bifurcating
proceedings in cases of non-appearance to justify the tribunal’s
decision. 164 The tribunal of the South China Sea Arbitration might
have used China’s non-appearance to justify the necessity of the
bifurcation order, had the tribunal not also held the objections raised
in China’s extra-procedural communication to effectively constitute
a plea concerning the tribunal’s jurisdiction to which Article 20(3) of
the Rules of Procedure shall apply.
However, the actions of the arbitral tribunals are no perfectly
akin to the ICJ’s approach to cases involving non-appearance. In
cases of non-appearance, while the Court did issue procedural
orders on bifurcation without waiting for formal preliminary
objections required by Article 79 of the Rules of Court, the Court
never took non-appearance as justification when issuing orders of
bifurcation, nor did it regard non-appearance as having preemptory effect on bifurcation. 165 In other words, if the objection
162 See South China Sea Arb. Proc. Order No. 4, supra note 150, ¶ 2 (noting Proc
Order No. 4 (bifurcation) was made in about four months after the time-limit set for
China to submit counter memorial).
163 See Arctic Sunrise Arb. Proc. Order No. 4, supra note 142, ¶ 2 (outlining the
timeline of events leading to the outcome in the Order).
164 See South China Sea Arb. Proc. Order No. 4, supra note 150, ¶ 3 (discussing
the circumstances that led the tribunal to its determination).
165 See Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Jurisdiction of the Court, supra note
87, ¶ 12; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.) Judgment on Jurisdiction
and Admissibility, supra note 87, ¶¶ 14-15; U.S. Diplomatic Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), Judgement, supra note 83 and accompanying text (portraying the impact of
different facts and outcomes across cases). See also ROSENNE, supra note 13, at 808
(lending insight into the approach of the ICJ to questions of non-appearance).
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raised in extra-procedural communications is no longer regarded as
constituting the formal preliminary objection, the non-appearing
state cannot obtain a right to bifurcation within the meaning of
Article 79. The tribunal’s application of Article 20 of the Rules of
Procedures, however, together with its unique approach to nonappearance in South China Sea Arbitration, imply an
acknowledgement of a procedural right of the non-appearing party
who had timely raised its objection concerning jurisdiction.
Ultimately, both tribunals relied on an identical Article 20 of the
Rules of Procedure to bifurcate the proceedings, arguably for the
purpose of promoting procedural legitimacy in cases of nonappearance.
3.3. Incorporation of Elements of Article 79 of the ICJ Rules of Court
In the other two cases, the tribunals’ Rules of Procedure
incorporate major elements of Article 79 of the ICJ Rules of Court,
which enable rule-based bifurcation. In the ARA Libertad Arbitration
(Argentina v. Ghana), Article 13 of the tribunal’s Rules of Procedure
provides:
3. Upon receipt of a Preliminary Objection under paragraph
2(a), the proceedings on the merits shall be suspended.
Argentina shall be entitled to file a written statement of its
observations and submissions no later than three months
from the filing by Ghana of its submissions on the
Preliminary Objection.
4. Any Preliminary Objection by Ghana shall be dealt with
by way of an oral hearing. After hearing the Parties, the
Arbitral Tribunal shall rule on Ghana’s Preliminary
Objection either as a preliminary issue or in its final Award.
If the Tribunal rejects the preliminary objection or decides to
give the ruling in its final Award, Ghana shall submit its
Counter-Memorial no later than six months after that
decision. The Tribunal shall fix the time limits for further
proceedings.166

166 See The ARA Libertad Arb. (Argentina v. Ghana), PCA Case Repository,
Rules
of
Procedure,
art.
13
(Perm.
Ct.
Arb.
2013),
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/427 [https://perma.cc/58TV-K6GB].

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss4/5

2019]

Bifurcation in Inter-State Cases

971

By raising preliminary objections, Ghana obtains a separate
proceeding containing one round of written submissions an oral
debate on preliminary objections.167 The proceedings on the merits
shall also be suspended accordingly. 168 At the closure of this
separate proceeding (on Preliminary Objection in toto but not on the
matter of bifurcation), there will be a ruling on Ghana’s Preliminary
Objection either upholding or rejecting the preliminary objections,
or a decision to give the ruling in its final award.169 This provision,
however, is silent as to whether such a ruling or decision shall be
made in the form of a judgment (award). This is very similar to the
rule-based bifurcation that Article 79 of the ICJ Rules of Court
contemplates.170
In this case, Ghana appeared to be a reluctant respondent as it
“never did get around to appointing an arbitrator.”171 Pending the
constitution of the arbitral tribunal, Argentina petitioned ITLOS for
a provisional measure pursuant to Article 290(5) of UNCLOS. 172
Ghana submitted a written statement in which it stated that the
“Annex VII arbitral tribunal which is to be constituted will not have
jurisdiction over the dispute submitted to it by Argentina.” 173

See id.
See id.
169 See id.
170 See Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts & Docs, art. 79 (outlining the procedural rules
of the ICJ).
171
See Susan Simpson, Argentina’s Sham Annex VII Arbitration and ITLOS’
Provisional Ruling on the Merits of the ARA Libertad Case, THE VIEW FROM LL2
(Feb. 9, 2013), https://viewfromll2.com/2013/02/09/argentinas-sham-annex-viiarbitration-and-itlos-provisional-ruling-on-the-merits-of-the-ara-libertad-case
[https://perma.cc/PE96-LFMA] (discussing an observation based on the available
records to Ms. Simpson. She noted that paragraph 70 of Argentine’s Request for
Provisional Measures, Argentina states: “[t]o date, Ghana has not appointed a
member of the arbitral tribunal and has not reacted to the invitation of Argentina
to enter into discussions with it for the purpose of appointing the other members of
the Annex VII arbitral tribunal.” But the page with paragraph 70 is missing in the
ITLOS website publicizing this request); see also, ITLOS “Frigate Ara Libertad”
(Argentina v. Ghana), Written Statement by Argentina, Request for the Prescription of
Provisions Measures Under Article 290, Paragraph 5, of the Unites Nations Convention on
the
Law
of
the
Sea,
(Nov.
14,
2012),
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/C20Request_for_official_website.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G7Q-Z8D7].
172 See “ARA Libertad” (Argentina v. Ghana), Provisional Measures, Order of
15 December 2012, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 332.
173 See ITLOS “Frigate Ara Libertad” (Argentina v. Ghana), Written Statement
by Ghana, Request for the Prescription of Provisions Measures Under Article 290,
Paragraph 5, of the Unites Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (Nov. 28, 2012), ¶
167
168
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Difficulties also arose in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.
When parties were unable to agree on the remaining three
arbitrators, the president of ITLOS made the appointment at the
request of Argentina. 174 This might suggest that by reaching
agreement with Argentina on Article 13—under which it acquired a
right to bifurcation—a reluctant Ghana was able to contest
jurisdiction exclusively; however, due to the limited disclosure of
proceedings one can only infer this possibility. The case was
ultimately terminated by agreement of the parties before the
deadline for Ghana to submit preliminary objections.175
In Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of
Azov, and Kerch Strait, Article 10 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure
(Objections to the Jurisdiction and/or Admissibility) provides:
4. The Arbitral Tribunal shall rule on any Preliminary
Objection in a preliminary phase of the proceedings, unless
the Arbitral Tribunal determines, after ascertaining the
views of the Parties, that such Objection does not possess an
exclusively preliminary character and should be ruled upon
in conjunction with the merits.
5. In the event that some or all of the Preliminary Objection(s)
are addressed in a preliminary phase, the proceedings on the
merits shall be suspended . . . .
6. Unless the Arbitral Tribunal decides otherwise after
ascertaining the views of the Parties, the further proceedings
shall be oral.
7. The written observations and submissions referred to in
paragraph 5, and the statements and evidence presented at
the hearings contemplated by paragraph 6, shall be confined
2,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/C20Request_for_official_website.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G7Q-Z8D7].
174 See Press Release, Int’l Tribunal for The Law of the Sea, Three Arbitrators
Appointed in the Arbitral Proceedings Instituted by the Argentine Republic against
the Republic of Ghana in respect of a Dispute concerning the Vessel Ara Libertad,
ITLOS/Press
189,
(Feb.
5,
2013),
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/press_releases_english/PR_1
89_E.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PBH-B7P2] (declaring three arbitrators appointed to
the arbitral proceedings between Argentina and Ghana).
175 See The Ara Libertad Arb. (Argentina v. Ghana), PCA 2013-11, Termination
Order, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013), ¶ 4-5, https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/429
[https://perma.cc/SCR7-TAJM] (declaring the termination of the international
arbitration because of the finding that Ghanaian courts of the rules applicable to the
case).
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to those matters which are relevant to the Preliminary
Objection . . .
8. The Arbitral Tribunal shall give its decision in the form of
an award, by which it shall uphold the objection or reject it
or declare that the objection does not possess, in the
circumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary
character. If the Arbitral Tribunal rejects the objection or
declares that it does not possess an exclusively preliminary
character, it shall fix time-limits for the further
proceedings.176
Article 10(4) of the Rules of Procedure in the instant case is very
similar to the mode of bifurcation that the identical Article 20(3) of
Rules of Procedure contemplates in the two non-appearance
cases. 177 This provision envisages a proceeding and decision on
bifurcation in the form of a procedural order akin to the tribunals’
practice in the two cases of non-appearance. Unlike the two nonappearance cases, hearings extend to matters relevant to
Preliminary Objection, 178 but are not necessarily confined to the
question of exception. More fundamentally, “the Arbitral Tribunal
shall give its decision in the form of an award,” including a declaration
that the objection does not possess an exclusively preliminary
character.179 Since this award is stipulated in the rule on jurisdiction
and/or admissibility, no doubt, it is a jurisdictional award. If this
award does not result in disposal of the case (by upholding the
objection), the tribunal “shall fix time-limits for the further
proceedings.” The pre-determined prescription of a jurisdictional
award implies that, notwithstanding the stipulated suspension in
Article 10(5), the proceedings on the merits shall be suspended upon
the submission of Preliminary Objection, until the time designated
by such an award.
On May 21, 2018, Russia timely submitted its Preliminary
Objection in accordance with Article 10(2), noting that “all the
176 See Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov,
and Kerch Strait (Ukr. v. Russ.), PCA 2017-06, Rules of Procedure, art. 10 (Perm. Ct.
Arb.
2017),
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2136
[https://perma.cc/6HUB-3RCN].
177 See id. Rules of Procedure, art. 10(4) (stating bifurcation is the principle
unless there is an exception that objection does not possess an exclusively
preliminary character).
178 See id. art. 10(6), 10(7).
179 Id. art. 10(8) (emphasis added).
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objections fall to be determined in a preliminary phase of the
proceedings in accordance with the general principle established by
Article 10(4) of the Rules of Procedure.”180 Ukraine was invited to
comment on Russia’s request for bifurcation, and Ukraine argued
that Russia’s objections were “deeply intertwined with the merits of
this case and lack an exclusively preliminary character.” 181
Accordingly, Ukraine requested that the tribunal declined Russia’s
request for bifurcation.182 Russia was invited to reply, and Russia
refuted Ukraine’s Comment. 183 In its Procedural Order No. 3
(“Regarding Bifurcation of the Proceeding”) on August 20, 2018, the
tribunal concluded that Russia’s Preliminary Objections appear at
this stage to be of a character that required them to be examined in a
preliminary phase and decided that the objections shall be
addressed in a preliminary phase of these proceedings.184 It follows
that, “if the tribunal determines after the closure of the preliminary
phase of the proceedings that there are Preliminary Objections that
do not possess an exclusive preliminary character,” such matters
shall be reserved to the proceedings on the merits, in accordance
with Article 10(8) of the Rules of Procedure.185
The tribunal’s bifurcation order was made nearly two years after
Ukraine initiated this arbitration.186 The proceeding on the matter
of bifurcation lasted three months. Whether this constitutes
unwarranted delay and cost, this is a matter of the parties’
appreciation. The tribunal devoted significant time to settling the
differences between the parties and to interpreting and applying
Article 10(4) of the Rules of Procedure. Article 10(4) requires the
tribunal to consider the question of exception and to decide whether
to bifurcate the proceeding.187 The tribunal justified the procedural
order for bifurcation on Article 10(4) with an interim appreciation of

180 See Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov,
and Kerch Strait (Ukr. v. Russ.), PCA 2017-06, Procedural Order No.3, Regarding
Bifurcation
of
the
Proceedings,
3
(Perm.
Ct.
Arb.
2017),
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2446 [https://perma.cc/K6VW-U25W].
181 See id. at 3.
182 See id.
183 See id. at 4.
184 Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
185 Id. (discussing the tribunal’s response should it find preliminary objections
that are not exclusively preliminary in nature).
186
The arbitration was initiated by Ukraine On September 16, 2016 and the
bifurcation order was delivered by the tribunal on August 20, 2018.
187 See supra note 176.
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Russia’s objections. 188 This is an improvement on the reasoning
behind the bifurcation decision by the South China Sea Arbitration
tribunal in the application of Article 20(3) of its Rules of
Procedure.189
Having said that, I find that it is not possible for the tribunal to
make a procedural order for non-bifurcation on the basis of an
interim conclusion that the objection does not possess an exclusively
preliminary character, because a conclusion as such must be made,
under Article 10(8), in the form of award and it cannot be interim.190
Article 10(8) restricts the tribunal when it issues a procedural order
on bifurcation: it must either state an interim appreciation of the
objection and leaves it to be further tested in the preliminary phase,
or determine that the objection possesses an exclusively preliminary
character and rule that they constitute preliminary questions. None
of them enable the tribunal to issue a procedural order for nonbifurcation. As such, the mini-proceeding and order on bifurcation
envisaged in Article 10(4) seem superfluous. Ultimately, bifurcation
is determined by Article 10(8). By this same award, the tribunal shall
conclude a proceeding initiated by Russia’s objection, irrespective of
whether this proceeding is termed “a preliminary phase” (in the
words of Article 10(5)) or not. The proceeding and this award do
not necessarily involve any decision on the matter of bifurcation.
Here, Russia is entitled to a procedural response to its preliminary
objection in the form of an [jurisdictional] award, through which the
tribunal adjudicates Russia’s objection.
The Rules of Procedure were adopted in the first procedural
meeting between the Parties on May 20, 2017, with consideration
given to concepts raised during the meeting.191 Here, Russia may
still reconsider under these Rules of Procedure whether to
participate in the proceedings on the merits when it obtains an
award either rejecting its objection or declaring that its objection
See supra note 184.
See supra note 153 and accompanying text (showing that the tribunal
neglected the question of exception (whether or not China’s objections do possess
an exclusively preliminary character) in its order for bifurcation and reserved the
matter to be considered and decided in the proceedings on preliminary objections).
190 See Dispute Concerning Coastal States Rights in [Several] Seas (Ukr. v.
Russ.), supra note 176, art. 10(8) (stating “the tribunal shall give its decision in the
form of award by which it shall . . . declare that objection does not possess an
exclusively preliminary character”) (emphasis added).
191 See generally Dispute Concerning Coastal States Rights in [Several] Seas
(Ukr. v. Russ.) Procedural Order 3, supra note 180, at 3 (discussing a State’s
alternatives as arbitral proceedings move forward).
188
189

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

976

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 40:4

does not possess an exclusively preliminary character as a result of
having contested jurisdiction in a separate proceeding.192 This may
suggest why Russia changed its stance of non-participation in Arctic
Sunrise. However, in order for Russia to participate in the
proceedings concerning Coastal States Rights for the sole purpose of
contesting jurisdiction, Russia must ensure a right to bifurcation to
be granted by a forthcoming Rules of Procedure before the tribunal
is constituted in order to avoid the routine non-bifurcation in the
other arbitral cases where both parties participate. This suggests
that Russia could have made a deal on this matter with Ukraine not
long after Ukraine initiated the arbitration against the backdrop of
the time framework of Annex VII.193 In so doing, Russia may avoid
the discomfort of no deal after it has appointed its arbitrator.
Moreover, it is too late for Russia to have such a deal when Russia is
no longer able to nominate its arbitrator, since participation is less
meaningful without its own arbitrator. All of which suggest an
agreement prior to the constitution of the tribunal. Again, due to the
limited disclosure of proceedings 194 we may only infer this early
agreement.
In UNCLOS Annex VII arbitration, when parties participate in
the constitution of the tribunal, the tribunal would maintain
flexibility with respect to bifurcation, as the tribunal adopts its Rules
of Procedure providing itself discretion on bifurcation. 195 In
practice, unless the parties agree on bifurcation, 196 the tribunal’s
192 See Dispute Concerning Coastal States Rights in [Several] Seas (Ukr. v.
Russ.), supra note 176, aArt. 10(8) (stating “The Arbitral Tribunal shall give its
decision in the form of an award, by which it shall uphold the objection or reject it
or declare that the objection does not possess, in the circumstances of the case, an
exclusively preliminary character.”).
193 See infra note 240-242 (discussing the 30-day rule on the nomination of the
arbitrator by the respondent and the nomination of the rest three arbitrators when
there is no agreement reached by the parties).
194
In the first procedural meeting the tribunal also made a procedural order
regarding confidentiality, by which the information about the proceedings may be
designated as confidential and subject to non-disclosure. See Dispute Concerning
Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukr. v. Russ.),
PCA 2017-06, Procedural Order No. 2, 18 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2018),
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2270
[https://perma.cc/QV2H-ZJBP]
(failing to public disclose discuss how the arbitrators were appointed or when the
arbitral tribunal was constituted—providing minimal to no information).
195 See supra note 111-119 and accompanying text.
196
One example of such an arrangement is in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case,
in which the parties agreed on bifurcation after the adoption of the Rules but before
the deadline for the submission of preliminary objections.
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flexibility terminates upon the rejection of the request to bifurcate.197
In order to avoid this scenario, a party intending to participate in a
separate proceeding contesting jurisdiction should pursue a deal
regarding the forthcoming Rules of Procedure, and this should
likely occur before the constitution of the tribunal. 198 In the two
cases of non-appearance, the tribunals, pursuant to Article 20 of
their respective Rules of Court, admitted objections raised in extraprocedural communications as preliminary objections, and ordered
bifurcation in each case.199
4.

BALANCING THE ISSUE OF BIFURCATION FOR JURISDICTIONAL
SENSITIVITY VS. PROCEDURAL EFFICIENCY

Jurisdictional questions in inter-state disputes are not mere
technical issues, since by raising questions concerning jurisdiction a
respondent state indicates “the absence of political agreement that
the Court should entertain the case.”200 Jurisdictional questions are
even more significant in cases of non-appearance where the
respondent contends that the absence of such a political agreement
was “manifest” by its refusal to appear.201
Bifurcation has been taken as a proper procedural response to
address this political sensitivity. In the Mavrommatis Palestine
Concessions case, the Court made the following observation when it
decided to bifurcate the proceedings:
Neither the Statute nor the Rules of Court contain any rule
regarding the procedure to be followed in the event of an
objection being taken in limine litis to the Court’s
jurisdiction. The Court therefore is at liberty to adopt the
principle which it considers best calculated to ensure the
administration of justice, most suited to procedure before an

See supra note 124, 127-128 and accompanying text.
See supra note 192-193 and accompanying text.
199 See supra note 144-145, 152-153 and accompanying text.
200
See ROSENNE, supra note 13, at 803 (discussing the substantive impact
jurisdictional questions can potentially have in proceedings).
201 See generally Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgement, 1974 I.C.J. Rep.
253, ¶ 4 (Dec. 20) (discussing France’s refusal to accept the Court’s jurisdiction and
therefore, “the French Government did not intend to appoint an agent, and
requested the Court to remove the case from its list.”); see also China’s Position
Paper, supra note 148, ¶¶ 3, 29, 85.
197
198
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international tribunal and most in conformity with the
fundamental principles of international law.
For this reason the Court, bearing in mind the fact that its
jurisdiction is limited, that it is invariably based on the
consent of the respondent and only exists in so far as this
consent has been given, cannot content itself with the
provisional conclusion that the dispute falls or not within the
terms of the Mandate. The Court, before giving judgment on
the merits of the case, will satisfy itself that the suit before it,
in the form in which it has been submitted and on the basis
of the facts hitherto established, falls to be decided by
application of the clauses of the Mandate.
For the
Mandatory has only accepted the Court’s jurisdiction for
such disputes. 202
In the preparation of the Rules of Court of 1922, Judge Anzillotti,
the sponsor of a draft article on preliminary objection, called on the
judges to pay attention to the “principle that the question of
jurisdiction must be decided by a special judgment to be given
before any procedure on the question as a whole was
commenced.”203 However, the judges disagreed on the proposed
principle, either because it was not generally recognized in
municipal laws, or because preserving procedural flexibility was
desirable.204 This debate continued in the course of discussion on
the 1926 revision; the necessity to lay down an absolute rule on
preliminary objection, which may restrict the Court’s liberty and
oblige it to consider objections and merits apart, again became the
center of the debate. 205 Indeed, it has been pointed out that
municipal laws vary on this matter,206 which seems to indicate that
in the management of justice, an absolute rule is not demanded.
Judge Anzilotti, on the basis that questions of jurisdiction in
international cases differ from those in municipal cases, argued that
municipal law analogies could not be automatically applied in
international cases and warned against prejudicing the essential
See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, supra note 29, at 16.
See Preparation of the Rules of Court of January 30th, 1922 P.C.I.J. (ser. D)
No. 2, at 213 (defining the draft rules submitted by the Drafting Committee).
204 See id. at 213-214.
205
See generally Acts and Documents concerning the Organization of the
Court, supra note 46, at 78-94.
206 See id. at 81, 82, 85 (discussing the differences in the civil procedure laws of
Holland, France and Spain).
202
203
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principle of State sovereignty.207 This time, with accumulation of the
experience of bifurcation in Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions and
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Judge Anzilotti’s view
was shared by many others.208 A new Article 38 was added to the
1926 Rules of Court, based on Judge Anzilotti’s proposal.209 Judge
Anzilotti unfailingly maintained that the separate handling of
preliminary objections is the required procedure for international
cases. 210 This was subsequently confirmed by the Court as the
objective of Article 38.211
Since the 1970s, the Court’s handling of preliminary objections
has raised efficiency concerns since proceedings on preliminary
objections has becoming markedly longer. 212 The 1972 and 2001
revisions of the Rules of Court were motivated, in part, to improve
the Court’s efficiency with respect to the handling of preliminary
objections. 213 Apart from the technical question of whether the
proceedings on preliminary objections can be dealt with in a more
expeditious way, the issue raised a fundamental question whether
the efficiency of the Court will decline as a result of bifurcation.
In specific cases, efficiency may be promoted if the court or
tribunal upholds an objection, resulting in disposal of the case in the
preliminary phase. This might contribute to a well-accepted
perception that bifurcation promotes efficiency. However, concern
with procedural efficiency under ICJ’s systematic bifurcation is not
unwarranted, since most bifurcated cases were not dismissed due to
lack of jurisdiction. The Permanent Court declined jurisdiction in
two out of 12 bifurcated cases. 214
The ICJ appears less
accommodating to jurisdictional objections in the majority of
207 See id. at 84, 90 (discussing the difference in resolving the question of
jurisdiction between international and municipal cases).
208 See id. at 89-92.
209 See id. at 93.
210 See Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, supra note 32, at 30.
211 See Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools) (Ger. v. Pol.),
Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. Rep Series A15, at 22.
212 See Prager, supra note 96, at 156-57 (detailing the number of measure the
Court adopted in order to increase the efficiency of proceeding by “tight[ing] the
deliberations in proceedings on preliminary objections . . . [to] inform parties in
advance of its intended schedule . . . “).
213 See id. at 155-56; see also Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 58, at 11
(discussing “The need to regulate [the] Rule of Court [in] the handling of
preliminary objection in a more expeditious and rational way . . . “).
214 See Shabtai Rosenne, The 1972 Revision of the Rules of International Court of
Justice, 8 ISR. L. REV. 197, 235 (1973) (discussing the Court declining jurisdiction in
the case of Mavrommatis (Readaptation) and the case of Phosphates in Morocco).
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bifurcated cases where preliminary objections were formally
raised, 215 however, it declined jurisdiction in fewer cases of
“isolation of jurisdiction,” in which proceedings were also
bifurcated. 216 That is to say, the majority of the World Court’s
215
Judgements on jurisdiction and admissibility have been rendered in the
following cases as a result of raising formal preliminary objections (in those cases
underlined, the Court declined jurisdiction): Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.); Rights of
Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.); Ambatielos (Greece v.
U.K.); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran); Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.); Monetary Gold
Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K. and U.S.); Right of Passage over Indian
Territory (Port. v. India)); Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.); Aerial Incident of July 27, 1955
(Isr. v. Bulg.); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain);
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.); South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S.
Afr.); Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain) (New Application: 1962); Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.; Libya v. U.S.) (discontinued after preliminary objection phase);
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro); Land and
Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Eq. Guinea
intervening); Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo); Legality of Use of Force
(Serb. & Montenegro v. Belg.); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.); Certain Property (Liech. v. Ger.);
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.); Application of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.);
Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between Nicaragua and Colombia
Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicar. v. Colom.); Alleged
Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v.
Colom.); Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms
Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. U.K.); Maritime Delimitation in the
Indian Ocean (Som. v. Kenya). In Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), preliminary
objections were formally raised but the parties subsequently agreed to have these
objections decided together with the merits. Preliminary objections were also
raised in the following cases but discontinued at some point in the preliminary
phase: Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (U.S. v. Bulg.); Compagnie du Port, des Quais et
des Entrepôts de Beyrouth and Société Radio-Orient (Fr. v. Leb.); Aerial Incident of 3 July
1988 (Iran v. U.S.); Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters (Belg. v. Switz.).
216
For the notion of “isolation of jurisdiction,” see ROSENNE, supra note 96 and
accompanying text. Judgements on jurisdiction and admissibility have been
rendered in the following cases as a result of “isolation of jurisdiction”: Fisheries
Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.; Ger. v. Ice.); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.); Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.);
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v.
Bahr.). Moreover, the Court declined jurisdiction in the following cases of “isolation
of jurisdiction”: Nuclear Tests (Aust. v. Fr.; N.Z. v. Fr.); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
(Greece v. Turkey); Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.); Aerial Incident of 10 August
1999 (Pak. v. India); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application:
2002) (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda); Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to
Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. India);
Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and
to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. Pak.).
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bifurcated cases contain two-phase proceedings. In Annex VII
arbitration, although a majority of cases did not bifurcate
proceedings, proceedings terminated at the jurisdictional phase in
only one of four bifurcated cases.217 In any event, efficiency becomes
a significant issue if the court or the tribunal spends more time in
two-phase proceedings adjudicating objections and merits
separately than in a single proceeding in which objections will be
adjudicated together with merits.
But this hypothesis is difficult to prove. After all, it is not
possible to answer this question in a specific case since the same case
cannot be adjudicated both with and without bifurcation for
comparison. An alternative method to compare the average time
cost in cases of bifurcation with those of non-bifurcation was
employed in an empirical study of international investment
arbitration under ICSID, cognizant that the empirical evidence was
imperfect. 218 This study found that the average time and cost of
bifurcated ICSID cases was greater than cases of non-bifurcation,
which is contrary to the accepted view that bifurcation promotes
efficiency. 219 The discovery illustrates a potential approach to
answering generic question about the efficiency of bifurcation, in
light of the great number of ICSID bifurcated cases employing twophase proceedings.220
This alternative method of measurement is not applicable to the
ICJ/PCIJ or to Annex VII arbitrations due to the wide divergence
among the samples which undermines a proper comparison. 221
217 See Southern Bluefin Tuna Case between Australia and Japan, Award on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 102 (highlighting the frequency with
which proceedings move beyond the jurisdictional phase). The other two cases of
non-appearance (Arctic Sunrise and South China Sea Arbitration, also bifurcated
cases) each contains two-phase proceedings. The tribunal decided to bifurcate the
proceedings in 2018 in the Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea
of Azov, and Kerch Strait case. The award on jurisdiction is still pending.
218 See Lucy Greenwood, Does Bifurcation Really Promote Efficiency?, 28 J. INT’L
ARB. 105, 107 (2011) (“[C]ases can vary significantly in terms of factual and legal
complexity. Clearly, there are many reasons for a case taking a longer time to be
decided than others, not only whether the case is bifurcated.”).
219 See id. at 106-07.
220 See id. at 107 (demonstrating that for the cases of bifurcation, ten out of
forty-five ICSID cases and two out of ten ICSID Additional Facility cases ended at
the preliminary stage).
221
In PCIJ/ICJ, the rule-based, systematic bifurcation simply renders the
samples for comparison (with a limited number of non-bifurcation cases) extremely
disproportionate. The problem of samples for comparison also exists in Annex VII
arbitration where non-bifurcation becomes overwhelming: only four (Southern
Bluefin Tuna Case; Arctic Sunrise; South China Sea Arbitration; and Dispute Concerning
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However, the finding on this question concerning the efficiency of
bifurcation in the empirical study of ICSID cases is indeed the
common understanding in PCIJ/ICJ as well as in Annex VII
arbitration. In PCIJ/ICJ, the Court itself considered that bifurcation
would cause unwanted delay when it decided not to bifurcate the
proceedings.222 Presumably, the parties in specific cases shared the
same viewpoint when they reached agreement not to bifurcate the
Moreover, a party might decline to raise
proceedings. 223
preliminary objections in order to expedite proceedings.224 Notably,
in Annex VII arbitration, the Philippines in South China Sea
Arbitration and Ukraine in Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in
the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait cited “unnecessary delay
and expense” or “unwarranted delay and expense” to show their
aversion to bifurcation. 225 Examples of ICSID practices also
strongly suggest that these tribunals would not grant bifurcation if
the request for bifurcation is to be taken as a mere delaying tactic.226
As the ICJ and Annex VII arbitration are both forums for the
settlement of inter-state disputes, political sensitivity concerning
jurisdiction are likely to be similar. It is also conventional wisdom
in these forums that efficiency declines as a result of bifurcation. But
in the ICJ, since the matter of bifurcation is subject to rule-based
regulation that has been systematically applied, bifurcation is the
routine practice of the Court. 227 In contrast, Annex VII arbitral
tribunals maintain flexibility on the issue of bifurcation in the Rules
Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait) out of 14 cases have
been bifurcated.
222
See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. Rep.12 (Oct. 16)
(illustrating that in the exercise of its advisory opinion, the Court shall also be
guided by the provisions of the Statute and of these Rules which apply in
contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to be applicable). See
also Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts & Docs, art. 102(2).
223 See generally Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.),
Order of Dec. 13, 2000, ICJ Rep. 235-36 (providing an example in which the parties
agreed not to bifurcate proceedings).
224 See Shigeki Sakamoto, The Whaling in the Antarctic Case from a Japanese
Perspective, 58 JAPANESE YEARBOOK. INT’L L. 247, 248 (2015) (“However, Japan did
not raise preliminary objections; rather, they implemented litigation tactics by
contesting the jurisdiction jointly with the merits . . . From this course of action, it
seems that both Japan and Australia preferred an early decision on the merits so as
not to harm the generally friendly relations between the two countries.”).
225 See South China Sea Arb. Proc. Order No. 4, supra note 150, §2.1; Dispute
Concerning Coastal States Rights in [Several] Seas (Ukr. v. Russ.) Procedural Order
3, supra note 180, at 3.
226 See Benedettelli, supra note 117, at 502; Greenwood, supra note 218, at 108.
227 See supra Part 2.2.
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of Procedure in the majority of the cases, and in practice these
tribunals have been reluctant to grant bifurcation. Why is the matter
of bifurcation treated so differently in these two forums?
There are differences between the two forums. The ICJ is an
adjudicative body with a standing court, whereas an Annex VII
tribunal is an ad hoc body. The cost of an ad hoc arbitration is higher
for the parties compared with a standing court. 228 The Rules of
Procedure adopted by Annex VII tribunals often contain guidance
to conduct the proceedings so as to “avoid unnecessary delay and
expense.”229 Although this is a hallmark of arbitration, it is absent
from the ICJ Statute or the Rules of Court.230
Jurisdictional sensitivity in the adjudication of inter-state
disputes motivated the PCIJ to introduce rule-based bifurcation into
its article governing preliminary objections in 1926.231 Rule-based
bifurcation has been retained to the present day in the 1972 and 2001
revisions to the article governing preliminary objection,
notwithstanding that the aim of these revisions was to promote
judicial efficiency. 232 Changes in the two revisions sought to
expedite proceedings on preliminary objections.233 One explanation
for this is that the political sensitivity of jurisdictional issues remains
as high as it was in the 1920s.234 Concerns over efficiency, though
228 See UNCLOS, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. at Annex VII,
art. 7 (highlighting that unlike a standing court (e.g. ICJ or ITLOS), the expenses of
the arbitral tribunal borne by the parties include the remuneration of its members).
229 See The Arctic Sunrise Arb. Rules of Proc., supra note 133, art. 10(1); The
South China Sea Arb. Rules of Proc., supra note 133, art. 10(1). The Permanent Court
of Arbitration (PCA) acting with secretarial assistance for most of Annex VII
arbitration cases (except for the South Bluefin Tuna case in which ICSID provided
secretarial assistance) provides its model PCA Arbitration Rules containing a
similar provision. PCA Arbitration Rules 2012, supra note 117, art. 17(1).
230
See ITLOS Rules of the Tribunal, supra note 22, (providing that “[t]he
proceedings before the Tribunal shall be conducted without unnecessary delay or
expense.”). It is argued that ITLOS truly functions as an arbitrary body. Thomas E.
Robins, The Peculiar Case of the ARA Libertad: Provisional Measures and Prejudice to the
Arbitral Tribunal’s Final Result 20 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 265, 276 (2015). It is noted
that in seven “normal” cases adjudicated by ITLOS, five of them were cases initially
referred to Annex VII arbitration but later transferred to ITLOS (or its Chamber) by
“Special Agreement” reached by the parties. See generally ITLOS Reports, supra note
21 (providing a clearer understanding of the various forms arbitral proceedings
may take).
231 See supra note 207-209 and accompanying text.
232 See supra note 99-100 and accompanying text.
233 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
234 See SHABTAI ROSENNE, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (2007)
263 (“Comparison of the Rules of 1978 with those of 1922 will quickly show that
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real, are secondary at least as far as the issue of bifurcation in the
standing court of the ICJ.
An ad hoc tribunal presiding over an inter-state arbitration may
balance the issues of jurisdictional sensitivity and procedural
efficiency in deciding whether to bifurcate proceedings. Whenever
the parities participate in the constitution of the ad hoc arbitral
tribunal, to which each of the parties can appoint one arbitrator of
their own choice,235 jurisdictional issues may be perceived by the
tribunal as less sensitive between the parties, thus permitting it to
render a procedural ruling on an ad hoc basis. This may explain in
part why in a majority of Annex VII arbitrations where both parties
participate, the rule on preliminary objection provided the tribunals
with discretion on the issue of bifurcation. Indeed, preliminary
objections have not been raised often in these cases, but whenever
raised, efficiency concerns appear to prevail as no bifurcation has
been granted.
In contrast, when the respondent states refused to participate in
the constitution of the tribunals in Arctic Sunrise and South China Sea
Arbitration, the two tribunals were forced to address jurisdictional
sensitivity. The tribunals, in the irrespective Rules of Procedures,
favored bifurcation in principle and bifurcated the proceedings in
each of these cases in actual practice.236 Nevertheless, this kind of
balancing of the issue of bifurcation in Annex VII arbitrations will
put unwilling respondents in an untenable situation: participation
means less jurisdictional sensitivity and potentially a negative
decision on bifurcation; non-appearance of the unwilling
respondent, on the other hand, is thought to deserve bifurcation
where it can argue exclusively on jurisdiction. Yet the unwilling
respondent must deprive itself of such opportunity.
For an unwilling respondent who intends to participate in the
proceedings for the sole purpose of contesting jurisdiction, a way to
break this conundrum is to make a deal with the applicant regarding
the possibility of rule-based bifurcation (before the tribunal is
constituted). I infer this possibility in ARA Libertad Arbitration and
they are all case in the same mold, the mold of diplomacy of the 1920s. The changes
that have been made do not touch fundamentals”).
235 See UNCLOS, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. at Annex VII.
art. 3(b)-(c).
236
In South China Sea Arbitration, the tribunal did so notwithstanding the
Philippines’ accusation that it would “needlessly prolong and increase the costs” in
opposing bifurcation. See South China Sea Arb. Proc. Order No. 4, supra note 150,
at 4 and 6.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss4/5

2019]

Bifurcation in Inter-State Cases

985

Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov,
and Kerch Strait, where the reluctant respondents eventually
participated in the constitution of the arbitral tribunals. 237
Ultimately, the apparent sensitivity of the jurisdictional issue in
these two cases appears to have motivated the tribunals, after
ascertaining views of the parties, to incorporate a rule-based
bifurcation (self-contained proceedings on jurisdiction and
admissibility) into the Rules of Procedure.
Finally, we get back to South China Sea Arbitration—why was
China so resolute in deciding nonappearance as the manner of
rejecting and returning the Philippines Notification and
Statement? 238 It is very plausible that China might have simply
passed over the idea of making any procedural deal with the
Philippines when it observed the Philippines’ moves in the initiation
of the arbitration as being firmly uncompromising. Above all, there
had been no substantial exchange of views on the subject matter
before initiation of arbitration, 239 and the stunning suddenness of
this legal action looked like a legal ambush and appeared
procedurally hostile.
The Philippines initiated arbitration two weeks before the
Chinese Lunar New Year of 2013 (the biggest festival and longest
national holiday in China). Annex VII only provided thirty days
from the receipt of the notification of arbitration for China to prepare
the nomination of its arbitrator. 240 Given the experience of the
Philippines’ team, this timing can hardly be taken as a mere
coincidence. Against the backdrop of the time framework of Annex
See supra notes 171-175; 191-194 and accompanying text.
See Letter from PRC to Philippines 2013, supra note 146.
239
China made this point in China’s Position Paper on the Matter of
Jurisdiction. China emphasized that the two countries agreed in principle that they
should settle their disputes by negotiation. See China’s Position Paper, supra note
148, ¶¶ 30-41, 45-50. The tribunal cited Chagos Marine Protected Area and Arctic
Sunrise, which was of the view that “Article 283 then requires that the Parties
engage in some exchange of views regarding the means to settle the dispute,” and
“Article 283(1) does not require the Parties to engage in negotiations regarding the
subject matter of the dispute.” See The South China Sea Arb. Award on Jurisdiction
and Admissibility, supra note 161, ¶ 333.
240 See UNCLOS, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. at Annex VII,
art. 3(c) (“The other party to the dispute shall, within 30 days of receipt of the
notification referred to in article l of this Annex, appoint one member to be chosen
preferably from the list, who may be its national. If the appointment is not made
within that period, the party instituting the proceedings may, within two weeks of
the expiration of that period, request that the appointment be made in accordance
with subparagraph (e).”).
237
238
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VII, this timing suggests that the Philippines was prepared for no
agreement on the selection of the three arbitrators under Annex VII
Article 3(d), in which case they shall be selected by the President of
ITLOS, 241 who at that time was a national of another country
pressing the territorial/maritime dispute with China.242 Ultimately,
the combination of the timing of the filing of the case and the 30-day
rule is not without significance for China in evaluating the
circumstances. This limited lead time presented China with a
decision of whether or not to approach the Philippines to discuss
procedures within the 30 days before the constitution of the tribunal.
This approach, however, given the circumstances, would have been
impractical.
5.

CONCLUSION

While both the ICJ/PCIJ and UNCLOS Annex VII tribunals are
judicial forums for the settlement of inter-state disputes, there is
great divergence between the rules and practices of bifurcation
under the ICJ/PCIJ (a standing court) and those of an ad hoc
arbitration governed by UNCLOS Annex VII.
At the ICJ, a party is in principle, entitled to raise preliminary
objections. If it does so, bifurcation is the resultant procedural
avenue under the ICJ Rules of Court.243 The matter of bifurcation is
thus strictly regulated by the Rules of Court (rule-based bifurcation).
In UNCLOS Annex VII arbitration, the rules of procedure in the
majority of cases provides tribunals with discretion in deciding
whether or not to bifurcate proceedings. In practice, the tribunal’s
flexibility terminates upon the rejection of the request to bifurcate.
Bifurcation has been granted in two cases of non-appearance and in
one case by agreement of the parties—in the Southern Bluefin Tuna
case. In ARA Libertad Arbitration and Dispute Concerning Coastal State
Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait, the rule-based
bifurcation has been adopted in the tribunal’s Rules of Procedure,
probably at the insistence of unwilling respondent states and with
See id. arts. 3(d)-(e).
The author does not question the competence or impartiality of Judge
Yanai of Japan in carrying out his duties to make the necessary appointments as
President of ITLOS under Annex VII art. 3(e). Attention to this timing (as it was
possibly perceived by the Philippines as taking advantage) is paid here to illustrate
the non-compromising posture of the Philippines.
243 See supra Part 2.
241
242
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the cooperation of the applicants prior to the constitution of the
tribunals. In the latter case, bifurcation was decided in a procedural
order, which appeared superfluous in the application of the Rules.
In Annex VII arbitration, unless a rule-based bifurcation has
been agreed by the parties prior to the constitution of the tribunal,
bifurcation is no longer a procedural right for an unwilling state who
intends to contest jurisdiction exclusively in the first place.
Bifurcation in the two cases of non-appearance indicates that, by
depriving parties of the ability to argue jurisdiction in a bifurcated
proceeding without being deemed to have appeared, the tribunal
forces parties to elect between the undesirable options of nonappearance or risking the appearance on a preliminary matter
without having been granted bifurcation.
The divergence in practice may be determined by the distinctive
nature of the two forums (adjudicative/standing court versus
arbitral/ad hoc tribunal) as decisionmakers balance jurisdictional
sensitivity against procedural efficiency to decide the issue of
bifurcation. In inter-state adjudications by a standing court,
jurisdictional sensitivity seems to prevail over efficiency, as seen in
the ICJ’s adherence to rule-based bifurcation, notwithstanding the
generally accepted belief that the Court’s efficiency declines when it
bifurcates proceedings. In contrast, Annex VII arbitral tribunals
resist bifurcation in favor of efficiency. Nevertheless, jurisdictional
sensitivity in inter-state disputes, including UNCLOS disputes,
remains as high today as it was in the 1920s. However, although
Annex VII arbitration is categorized as an arbitral body, it remains
as an important adjudicatory body in actual nature, standing side by
side with ICJ and ITLOS for the judicial settlement of UNCLOS
disputes— proceedings initiated by means of application.244 If the
essence of an Annex VII arbitral tribunal is closer to that of an
adjudicative body than arbitral body, the value of rule-based
bifurcation should be carefully considered. If such is the case, an
Annex VII arbitral tribunal may ensure the legitimacy of its
judgments by adhering to the best practice firmly rooted in the PCIJ
and ICJ since the 1920s: that in the words of Judge Anzilotti, the

244 See UNCLOS, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. at art. 287
(showing that under art. 287(5), Annex VII arbitration becomes default if the Parties
have not accepted the same procedure available under art. 287(1); or, under art.
287(3), default when no preference has been made with respect to the means of
dispute resolution available under art. 287(1), according to which the other two are
ICJ and ITLOS).
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separate handling of preliminary objections is required procedure
for international cases.245

245 See Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, supra note 32, at 30
(drawing observations by Judge Anzilotti). In the first UNCLOS inter-state
compulsory conciliation case ([2016-10] Conciliation between The Democratic
Republic of Timor-Leste and The Commonwealth of Australia), whose proceedings
became available to public just recently, the practice on bifurcation in this case may
attract our attention. This non-binding inter-state dispute settlement procedure
was initiated by Timor-Leste against Australia pursuant to Article 298(1)(a)(i) and
Annex V, section 2 of the UNCLOS, the Conciliation Commission retains discretion
on the matter of bifurcation without necessity to state reasons, see The Democratic
Republic of Timor-Leste v. Australia, Rules of Procedure, PCA Case Repository,
art.17 (Aug. 22, 2016). However, upon receiving preliminary objections raised by
Australia, the Commission ultimately delivered the Decision on Competence before
it moved to the conciliation proceedings on the substance of the dispute. See The
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste v. Australia, Decision of Competence, PCA
Case Repository (Sept. 19, 2016). The Commission’s Decision on Competence was
regarded to have binding legal effect notwithstanding the non-binding character of
conciliation. See The Timor Sea Conciliation (Timor-Leste v. Austl.), Report and
Recommendations of the Compulsory Conciliation Commission between TimorLeste and Australia on the Timor Sea, PCA Case Repository, para. 66 (May 9, 2018).
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